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ABSTRACT 
  This Article proposes recalibrating the separation of powers 
between the political branches in the context of their regulation of 
immigration law’s core questions: how many and what types of 
immigrants to admit to the United States. Whereas Congress holds a 
virtual monopoly over formal decisionmaking, the executive branch 
makes de facto admissions decisions using its discretionary 
enforcement power. As a result of this structure, stasis and excessive 
prosecutorial discretion characterize the regime, particularly with 
respect to labor migration. Both of these features exacerbate 
pathologies associated with illegal immigration and call for a 
structural response. This Article contends that Congress should create 
an executive branch agency, marked by indicia of independence, to set 
visa policy—an avenue increasingly contemplated by reformers. 
Though it may seem counterintuitive, delegation of greater authority 
can help constrain executive power by substituting a transparent 
process, subject to monitoring, for decisionmaking that occurs hidden 
from view. Delegation can also help overcome limitations in the 
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legislative process that contribute to the current regime’s dysfunction, 
making immigration policy more efficient and effective. The Refugee 
Act of 1980 provides a parallel that is helpful in thinking through 
what it would mean to delegate ex ante admissions power to the 
executive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In The President and Immigration Law,1 Adam Cox and I 
explore the relationship between executive and legislative 
decisionmaking in the immigration context, with a view to 
understanding how constitutional responsibility has been allocated 
between the political branches for answering “immigration policy’s 
core questions: what types of noncitizens, and how many, should be 
admitted to and permitted to reside in the United States.”2 Though 
statements of congressional primacy in relation to core policy matters 
 
 1. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE 
L.J. 458 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 462. 
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exist in Supreme Court dicta3 and have been repeated during 
legislative debates,4 the actual allocation of powers between the two 
branches, as a matter of practice, has been considerably more 
complex.5 The President and Immigration Law demonstrates through 
analysis of historical and contemporary instances of interaction 
between the branches that joint and sometimes competitive 
resolution of specific immigration problems, including refugee crises6 
and domestic labor shortages,7 has determined the contours of the 
separation of powers dynamically. 
More specifically, The President and Immigration Law elucidates 
two important features of the separation of powers in immigration 
law. First, as a formal matter, the power to make decisions regarding 
the core questions of immigration law has indeed come to reside with 
Congress,8 which maintains a monopoly on setting the numbers and 
types of visas issued each year. Second, however, the president 
exercises similar power over core immigration policy as a de facto 
matter, albeit indirectly and in a manner obscured from scrutiny, 
primarily through prosecutorial discretion or the use of discretionary 
enforcement power.9 The article concludes with an analysis of the 
 
 3. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of 
[immigration] policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 7700 and 55 Identical Bills to Amend the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 392 (1964) (statement of Rep. Feighan, Chairman, 
Subcomm. No. 1, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Mr. Secretary, does your proposal [to create an 
Immigration Board to allocate visas] suggest that Congress is inadequate for the task of 
establishing a clear and all-inclusive immigration policy?”); id. (testimony of Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State of the United States) (“No, Mr. Chairman. Both under the Constitution and 
under the practices of our system of government, it is for the Congress to establish the basic 
policy and the basic legislation.”); id. at 423 (statement of Rep. Feighan) (“Mr. Attorney 
General, to what extent does the administration proposal call upon Congress to divest itself of 
its traditional authority under decisions of the Supreme Court for regulating immigration into 
the United States?”). 
 5. For a detailed discussion of the dynamics of cooperation and competition that have 
unfolded between Congress and the executive, specifically in relation to the opeation of the 
Bracero guest worker program, the management of Haitain and Cuban refugee crises, and the 
formulation of contemporary enforcement policy, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 483–
528. 
 6. Id. at 492–509. 
 7. Id. at 485–91. 
 8. See id. at 483–84, 519–28; see also id. at 465–83 (discussing the extent to which 
congressional monopoly appears in court doctrine). 
 9. Id. at 510–30. 
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dysfunctions created by this de facto power, which include not only 
nontransparent decisionmaking, but also the perpetuation of illegal 
immigration. The article proposes that Congress address these 
dysfunctions through new approaches to institutional design, calling 
for “vertical integration”10 within the executive of authority over 
admissions and deportation policy.11 This integration would require 
Congress to delegate authority to the president to make core 
immigration determinations formally through ex ante procedures—
that is, to set visa numbers and types—rather than informally through 
back-end enforcement decisions. This change would thus shift certain 
decisions from the exclusive control of the legislative process to the 
realm of administrative law and process.12 
This Article considers in greater detail what that shift might look 
like and argues that delegation would advance two important 
objectives. First, the delegation of ex ante authority to the president 
promises to advance the objective outlined in The President and 
Immigration Law—the constraint of prosecutorial discretion. Second, 
the delegation would improve the accuracy and quality of the 
decisionmaking process surrounding labor immigration by breaking 
through the stasis that currently bedevils the system.13 This analysis is 
salient for the field of administrative law generally, because it 
demonstrates that delegating more power to the executive can in 
some cases constrain executive discretion, counterintuitive as this 
proposition might seem. Second, for the immigration field, this 
exploration underscores that departing from the conventional wisdom 
of congressional primacy through institutional reform could introduce 
much-needed flexibility and responsiveness into the system of 
immigrant screening. 
Part I advances the justification for delegation by considering 
what an ideal immigrant-admissions process would look like and why 
the ideal framework requires departure from the status quo. Part II 
 
 10. Id. at 537. 
 11. This focus on labor migration is warranted by the nature of the problems being 
addressed, but this shift in policy could affect the other streams of immigration into the United 
States: family-based immigration—the largest component of the system—and refugee 
admissions. Effects on the former are far more likely than on the latter, however, because 
refugee selection has operated in an independent sphere since at least 1980, after Congress 
passed the Refugee Act. For further discussion of these interrelationships, see infra notes 79–95 
and accompanying text. 
 12. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 537–46. 
 13. For a discussion of the problem of stasis, see infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text. 
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addresses the design question. Given the objectives outlined in Part I, 
what should be the role for each of the three key actors in the 
administrative drama: the president, Congress, and the bureaucracy? 
Second, what should the agency or commission decisionmaking 
structure look like? In answering these questions, Part II draws 
parallels to other instances of delegation, primarily the refugee-
selection system created by the Refugee Act of 1980, which provides 
a rich example of how the executive can participate in setting core 
immigration policy. As the experience with the Refugee Act reveals, 
a crucial design question involves determining the optimal degree of 
insulation from politics that a new agency should have in order to 
ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Given that this insulation must be 
balanced against the need for accountability to the public, Part II also 
explores how much political control over the agency ought to exist 
and whether Congress or the president should be the primary political 
actor in control. Part III focuses on the feasibility of the proposal. As 
a threshold matter, the question of whether Congress will be willing 
to give up its formal monopoly must be addressed, but the more 
important feasibility question ultimately will be whether a new 
agency or commission is likely to succeed in addressing the 
dysfunctions that The President and Immigration Law and other 
commentators have identified. 
Because of the number of design questions involved, and given 
that each design choice depends on how the other choices are made, 
providing a comprehensive blueprint for the new agency is beyond 
the scope of this Article. But the preferred strategy should be for 
Congress to create an independent agency or commission subject to 
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and additional 
congressional controls, including report-and-wait requirements and 
deadlines. To maintain independence, the commission should be 
located outside existing immigration agencies, but the commission’s 
decisionmaking process should include consultation with the 
Departments of Labor, State, and Homeland Security. The 
framework statute for the agency ought to include requirements that 
the agency set the number of visas for labor immigration by a certain 
date in the fiscal year and that the agency base its visa-limit 
judgments on collection and evaluation of particular types of data, 
along with the public comments submitted during notice-and-
comment procedures. This combination of features should help 
ensure that the agency sets visa limits that correspond with the 
evolving empirical reality but remains attentive to public opinion and 
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interest group preferences in a highly charged regulatory and political 
context. By calling for delegation, this Article ultimately advances the 
idea, often obscured in political debates, that immigration policy 
requires technical and data-driven determinations, along with moral 
and value judgments. 
I.  JUSTIFICATION 
For the sake of simplicity, and because the impetus for this 
proposal arises from dynamics related to labor migration and the 
attendant problem of illegal immigration, this Article focuses on how 
an agency or commission might channel labor migration, especially 
migration by low-skilled workers. To understand why the current 
separation of powers dynamic in immigration law calls for a 
delegation experiment, it is important to first conceptualize an 
optimal decisionmaking process. An ideal structure to govern labor 
migration would balance two basic objectives—flexibility and 
stability—while remaining attentive to the need for accountability.14 
A. The Systemic Ideal 
The regime governing labor migration should be flexible and 
capable of evolving along with the country’s economic and 
demographic needs. At the same time, the regime must be relatively 
stable and predictable, both to allow employers and other economic 
actors to plan and manage their expectations, and to build public 
confidence in and acceptance of the system as a whole. These 
objectives of responsiveness and stability may be in tension with one 
another, but this tension can be softened. Responsiveness to facts on 
the ground can help ensure predictability, and stability does not 
necessarily require that admissions numbers remain constant, only 
that they reflect evolving needs in a nonarbitrary manner. The salient 
point for the purposes of this Article is that the decisionmaking 
 
 14. The reformulation of the system that governs labor migration will likely have an impact 
on the family regime and other dimensions of immigration policy. Assuming that the number of 
immigrants the United States can realistically admit (for political or other reasons) is within a 
fixed range between five hundred thousand and one million entrants per year, the creation of a 
new decisionmaking structure with the potential to increase the number of economic migrants 
will put pressure on the family and refugee regimes. The reformulation of labor policy might 
thus prompt a debate about whether some of the family categories, such as brothers and sisters 
and adult children, ought to be eliminated. But to address the limitations of the current 
decisionmaking structure for channeling labor migration cleanly, I leave aside consideration of 
how to manage these tradeoffs. 
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structure for immigration policymaking ought to be capable of 
balancing these objectives. 
Creating a flexible system equipped to respond to changing 
circumstances will help promote efficiency and economic growth and 
create capacity for preventing illegal immigration through non-
enforcement-oriented means, thereby helping to mitigate the negative 
effects of such immigration on U.S. workers and secure ongoing 
public confidence in the regime.15 To be flexible, the system must be 
capable of responding to facts on the ground. The system should be 
able to adapt to fluctuations in the U.S. labor market,16 as well as to 
changes in the economic and demographic circumstances outside the 
United States that help shape migratory flows, particularly in the 
American hemisphere.17 Determining the number and types of 
immigrants to admit does depend upon value judgments concerning 
who should become part of the polity, on what terms, and with what 
effects on existing residents—the so-called “membership decision.”18 
But the process also has a technical dimension that requires data-
based projections about market dynamics and future economic and 
social needs. Regulating immigration effectively, therefore, demands 
a system equipped to evolve in response to the sociology and 
economy of migration. 
Predictability, on the other hand, requires avoiding dramatic 
fluctuations in rules. A predictable system will be somewhat insulated 
from day-to-day political pressures, whether in the form of interest 
group lobbying or the anti-immigrant, restrictionist shocks that 
occasionally arise from the electorate. Predictability not only allows 
employers and workers to manage their expectations, but also helps 
 
 15. Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and 
Enforcement, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2010) (noting that one of the reasons a 
sizeable population of unauthorized immigrants exists is that the immigration laws are out of 
step with the demand for labor). For a discussion of the problem of illegal immigration as a 
function of the distribution of decisionmaking power between Congress and the executive, see 
infra Part II.A. 
 16. For literature discussing the importance of this objective, see, for example, Susan 
Martin & B. Lindsay Lowell, Competing for Skills: U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1990, 11 LAW. 
& BUS. REV. AM. 387, 390–95 (2005); Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled 
Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 183–87 (2006). 
 17. For a discussion of the cross-border integrated nature of labor migration to the United 
States, see generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NORMAN J. MALONE, BEYOND 
SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
(2003). 
 18. For a classic analysis of immigration policy as distributing the good of membership, see 
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 61–63 (1983). 
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facilitate a stable and orderly flow of migration, which in turn helps 
secure public acceptance of immigration.19 
Predictability and responsiveness need not be mutually exclusive. 
A regime that adjusts in response to changed circumstances can also 
be predictable, if interested parties understand how the government 
anticipates and then adjusts to fluctuating conditions, or if clear 
standards, set out in advance of the actual decisionmaking, guide 
changes to the numbers of visas available from year to year. A goal of 
the decisionmaking structure, therefore, should be to determine how 
much predictability affected parties require to make decisions about 
their futures, and to be transparent about the mechanisms used to 
identify changed circumstances.20 
This process of balancing flexibility and predictability implicates 
yet another concern: the democracy question. A principle of 
accountability is implicit in the idea of predictability, which revolves 
around the importance of notice. In addition, even if effective 
policymaking requires some insulation from political pressures, the 
regime ultimately must respond to public views concerning acceptable 
levels of immigration, for reasons of democratic legitimacy in and of 
itself, as well as to nurture public confidence in government and 
acceptance of immigration over time. In other words, accountability 
must extend beyond the predictability that enables affected parties to 
plan, to include respect for the interests of the broader public. 
Securing public acceptance requires, at the very least, developing 
mechanisms for taking proper account of the interests of U.S. 
workers,21 as well as the interests of immigrants themselves, who may 
 
 19. I have written extensively elsewhere about the importance of managing the change 
produced by migration. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008). 
 20. Adam Cox has suggested to me that this goal might require segregating decisions about 
low-wage and high-skilled migrants, because the latter demand more predictability in light of 
their educational investment, and perhaps also in light of the more specialized nature of the 
labor they provide to employers. 
 21. I leave aside the question of the weight policymakers should give to this interest—that 
is, whether the interests of U.S. workers ought always to take priority over other goals, such as 
promoting growth, preventing illegal immigration, or even expanding opportunities for less-
well-off noncitizens. A policy that keeps immigration levels low by requiring punctilious 
certification that no U.S. workers are available for a job before a visa is issued may seem to 
promote the interests of U.S. workers by protecting their wages, but not if the result is high 
levels of illegal immigration or diminished job creation as the result of inadequate economic 
dynamism. Resolving this debate is well beyond the scope of this Article, but the important 
institutional point is that the designers should equip the decisionmaking regime to take account 
of these interests in relation to the other factors that shape a well-rounded immigration policy. 
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not be a formal part of the public but who nonetheless represent a 
key constituency of this particular policy process. Balancing 
insulation from short-term political pressures that might sidetrack 
efforts to ensure that visa policy tracks demographic and economic 
trends with long-term respect for popular opinion may be impossible 
to accomplish with precision. But the decisionmaking regime for 
channeling labor migration should be designed to be maximally 
capable of calibrating this balance. 
Though the case for delegation in the immigration context is 
made in the next Section, it is useful at this stage to reflect on general 
trends in administrative law scholarship that address some of the 
values just articulated. Many scholars increasingly emphasize the 
importance of ensuring agency accountability to the public, and this 
emphasis has produced a particularly vital literature advocating 
presidential control.22 At the same time, other scholars have argued 
that prioritization of accountability has obscured other important 
objectives, such as prevention of arbitrary decisionmaking—
objectives that agency design and judicial review might address.23 And 
still other scholars emphasize that accountability to the public can 
itself arise from bureaucratic insulation.24 Each of these positions has 
its virtues, but an appropriate synthesis of these concerns must 
include recognition that democratically legitimate decisionmaking 
demands more than direct political control. Indeed, democracy and 
rule-of-law values can be served by placing limits on 
 
 22. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2363–83 
(2001) (arguing that courts should “attempt . . . to recognize and promote [presidential] control 
over agency policymaking”). 
 23. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 475–78 (2003) (noting that excessive attention to 
political accountability has obscured other values, such as preventing arbitrary agency 
decisionmaking). For other critiques of the emphasis on majoritarian responsiveness, see 
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988, 1004–07 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1824–25 (1996). 
 24. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 53, 55 (2008) (arguing that “[f]orcing the politically responsive president to share power 
with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the variance in 
policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory inertia that 
mutes the significance of variation in the president’s policy preferences” and noting that “[t]his 
result contrasts sharply with the received wisdom that majoritarian values are best served by 
maximizing the degree to which politically responsive elected officials can control 
unaccountable bureaucrats”). 
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majoritarianism25—a possibility that must be continually taken into 
account when considering the allocation of decisionmaking authority 
among the branches. Several systemic values are thus in play and 
must be reconciled continually. 
B. Limitations of the Status Quo 
The current system does not come close to meeting the 
conditions described above. Two primary defects characterize it: 
stasis and excessive prosecutorial discretion. On the first score, the 
factors that influence migration fluctuate, as economic and 
demographic conditions change in the United States and Mexico, as 
well as other sending countries. But Congress, which maintains a 
monopoly on the system of legal labor migration that presumably 
exists to channel these pressures, infrequently adjusts the ceilings and 
categories that define the regime. Stasis defines the system. 
The last significant overhaul of the permanent labor migration 
categories occurred in 1990.26 A system of temporary visas has 
emerged to complement the permanent preferences, and the number 
of temporary immigrants admitted annually now dwarfs permanent 
migration.27 Though Congress has adjusted the number of temporary 
 
 25. The relevant question is not whether congressional control is preferable to presidential 
control, but whether maintaining attachment to formal congressional control offers a more 
democratically legitimate alternative to a system with high levels of both ex post executive 
screening and illegal immigration. For discussion of this point, see infra notes 72–75, 170–73 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. In 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
(NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.), allocating five thousand visas from the unskilled-labor category to persons 
from Nicaragua and Cuba, and permitting nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, the former 
Soviet Union, and most Eastern European nations to apply for cancellation of removal under 
more generous pre-1996 standards, id. § 203, 111 Stat. at 2199–201 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). This shift, however, did not change the overall number of available visas; 
instead, it represented a reaction to a discrete problem and responded in part to pressure from 
the executive. 
 27. The fact that a system of temporary labor immigration has grown up around the 
permanent regime suggests that Congress has responded to labor-market demands by admitting 
workers with temporary status to simultaneously respond to the need for labor, as well as and 
the public’s reluctance to admit greater numbers of immigrants for permanent membership. In 
2004, for example, approximately 1.5 million immigrants were admitted on a temporary basis, in 
contrast to the 155,000 permanent labor–based visas issued. See DEBORAH WALLER MEYERS, 
MIGRATION POLICY INST., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: A PATCHWORK POLICY 
RESPONSE 3 (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_12_Meyers.pdf. 
Only five thousand lawful permanent resident (LPR) visas are available per year in the 
employment categories for unskilled workers and workers with the equivalent of a Bachelor of 
Arts degree. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B) (establishing that no more than ten thousand visas 
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visas with more frequency than the permanent categories, employers 
consistently importune Congress to raise the ceilings. What is more, 
the number of visas for low-skilled migrants has remained 
consistently low and inadequate over time, if the rates of illegal 
immigration are at least partial evidence of demand.28 The current 
decisionmaking structure governing legal labor migration—
particularly the permanent regime—is neither flexible nor 
responsive.29 
Perhaps as a response to this rigidity, and with respect to low-
skilled labor in particular, a regime of illegal immigration has come to 
dominate the field. This regime is actually highly flexible and 
dynamic, because it is largely informal, but it is neither predictable 
nor democratic, and it runs counter to rule-of-law values. Before 
exploring these conclusions, it is important to see that the existence of 
the illegal regime is partially attributable to the current structure of 
regulation and the stasis that defines legal admissions. Though 
numerous factors likely motivate illegal entrants, at least three 
dynamics related to the existing allocation of decisionmaking 
authority could theoretically be at work. First, the system Congress 
has created and maintained contributes to illegal immigration: either 
illegal entrants have been waiting too long in backlogged immigration 
queues, or no queues exist for them to join in the first place because 
they lack the requisite labor profiles or family connections.30 Whereas 
the number of low-skilled immigrants Congress has authorized for 
 
can be made available to unskilled workers per year); id. § 1101 (allocating five thousand LPR 
visas from the ten thousand available to unskilled workers to beneficiaries of NACARA). 
 28. Such demand cannot be isolated from other factors, such as the desire for low-cost 
labor and failure to enforce labor laws. Holding these preferences constant, however, it seems 
that the demand for visas has outpaced supply. For a discussion of the motivations behind 
underenforcement of immigration policy, see infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
 29. This distinction raises the related question of whether the turn to temporary labor visas 
is itself misguided policy—a question well beyond the scope of this Article. Commentators 
consistently underscore that temporary regimes, even among educated H1-B workers, give rise 
to exploitative employer-employee relationships. For an argument that this regime, particularly 
the H1-B category, depresses the wages of U.S. workers and that employers respond to this 
charge by claiming skilled workers fill genuine labor shortages, see Susan Martin, B. Lindsay 
Lowell & Philip Martin, U.S. Immigration Policy: Admission of High Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 631 (2002). 
 30. For a description of the permanent admissions categories, see STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY 
& CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 304–10 (5th ed. 
2009). Congress also has erected a system that dramatically prefers family-based immigration to 
labor-based immigration. See Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 865, 872 (2008) (discussing the strong bias toward family migration). 
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admission has remained constant for decades, the demand for entry 
has consistently and dramatically exceeded the supply of visas.31 
Second, the enforcement challenge may well be overwhelming 
the executive branch, despite consistent and dramatic increases in 
enforcement budgets since the Clinton administration. The executive 
may be unable to fully control labor migration through construction 
of barriers at the border or deterrence and apprehension policies in 
the interior—the primary methods of ex ante control the executive 
possesses under the current regime.32 Finally, it may be that the 
executive has adopted a less-than-total enforcement policy,33 out of an 
interest in perpetuating low-cost labor,34 or perhaps because of a 
 
 31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 32. Some commentators have suggested that the desire for complete control is unrealistic. 
See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 819, 819–20 (1982) (“United States immigration law is rooted in the fundamental 
premise that the law can and should control the numbers and the characteristics of individuals 
entering the United States to live, work, and bear children; . . . although this premise fosters a 
degree of regulation, it runs counter to both past experience and our reasonable expectations 
for the future . . . .”). 
 33. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 534–45 (discussing this possibility); see also Kitty 
Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1061 (1990) (observing that early implementation efforts involved a 
“spirit of cooperation . . . devoted to establishing rapport with employers and encouraging 
voluntary compliance with employer sanctions”); Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement 
Mission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER 
SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 33, 41 (Michael Fix ed., 1991) (noting 
that INS guidelines adopted in the wake of IRCA “stressed cooperation with business” and 
sought to avoid “harassment and heavy-handed enforcement”); Stephen Lee, Private 
Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1126–29 (2009) (discussing 
literature exploring underenforcement of IRCA as policy). Others have discussed 
underenforcement as a more general problem. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND 
THE LAW 19 (1997) (noting that a major problem facing African Americans is not 
overenforcement but underenforcement of the law); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–17 (2006) (arguing that underenforcement occurs when the 
group in need of enforcement is a politically unpopular group, such as poor residents of crime-
ridden neighborhoods); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201, 
1204–06 (1996) (discussing reasons why zones in which law is not enforced as a matter of explicit 
policy arise, and noting that enforcement is sometimes politically unpalatable); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of 
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116–17 (2005) (noting that underenforcement is 
sometimes part of a larger regulatory scheme); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital 
Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 
707, 720–21 (2005) (arguing that the state’s failure to prevent crime should be treated as public 
policy). 
 34. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 545 (2007) (noting that border crackdowns are a more politically 
palatable but less effective means of enforcement than crackdowns on employers, but that 
enforcement against employers generates “determined resistance among a highly influential 
RODRIGUEZ IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:19:14 AM 
2010] CONSTRAINT THROUGH DELEGATION 1799 
humanitarian desire to enable the entry of immigrants with no legal 
options for admission.35 
These policy outcomes are not necessarily irrational. Congress 
may have very good reasons for leaving admissions ceilings in place 
for decades. Public opinion has not supported upward adjustments in 
visa numbers,36 suggesting that keeping admissions ceilings constant 
fulfills the accountability principle. At the same time, however, 
Congress’s failure to adjust these numbers may not reflect the 
average or median voter’s views on the subject as much as the lack of 
salience of the issue to most people most of the time, or the difficulty 
of surmounting interest group pressures to change the numbers, 
 
interest group,” suggesting obstacles to complete enforcement); see also INDEP. TASK FORCE 
ON IMMIGRATION & AM.’S FUTURE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION FACTS NO. 10, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SPENDING SINCE IRCA 4–5 (2005), available at http://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/FactSheet_Spending.pdf (showing that interior investigations have 
remained at only 10 percent of the enforcement budget over the past decade and that from 1991 
to 2003 interior enforcement shifted toward criminal enforcement and away from employer 
investigations). 
 35. In addition to being shaped by the executive’s own views about the number and types 
of immigrants who should be admitted, enforcement policy will also be affected by the due 
process constraints courts have placed on removal, by the humanitarian and social-policy 
concerns that militate against aggressive enforcement and complete deportation, and by the 
political pressures felt by the executive that may come from the business lobby, pro-immigrant 
members of Congress, or constituents in immigration-friendly or dependent states. See Cox & 
Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 537–40, 545–46. 
 36. Given that public opinion polls have suggested the public would prefer to admit fewer 
immigrants, congressional failure to alter visa numbers appears partially responsive to this set of 
public concerns. See, e.g., Peter Schuck, The Disconnect Between Public Attitudes and Policy 
Outcomes in Immigration, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 17, 20 (Carol Swain, ed. 2003) (“81 
percent of Americans oppose higher immigration—a level of opposition that contradicts the 
thrust of immigration’s political economy, which is decidedly expansionist . . . .”). It is not 
possible with the data the government publishes to determine what percentage of temporary 
workers become permanent. JEANNE BATALOVA, MIGRATION POLICY INST., INSIGHT NO. 14, 
THE GROWING CONNECTION BETWEEN TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEMS, 7–8 (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_Batalova.pdf. 
But particularly for skilled-employment–based immigration, temporary visas and subsequent 
status adjustment have become “the route into permanent residence for the overwhelming 
majority of employment-based green card recipients for the past decade.” DEMETRIOS G. 
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., ALIGNING TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 
VISAS WITH U.S. LABOR MARKET NEEDS: THE CASE FOR A NEW SYSTEM OF PROVISIONAL 
VISAS 7 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Provisional_visas.pdf. In 2008, 
for example, nearly 90 percent of employment-based permanent immigrants had previously held 
temporary visas. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 21 tbl.7 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf (showing that 149,542 of 166,511 
employment-based permanent immigrants experienced an adjustment of status). Certain 
categories of temporary visa holders, such as the H-2 categories of low- and midskilled workers, 
are not eligible for adjustment. PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra, at 20. 
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either up or down. Regardless of whether the system perfectly 
captures public preferences, a system that relies on underenforcement 
by the executive may not always be a negative, particularly given that 
the alternative could be the adoption of more police-like measures 
against employers and immigrants.37  
But the explicability of this regime does not justify it, and the 
system does a poor job of advancing the objectives outlined in Part 
I.A. Again, the formal regime is marked by stasis, even if it can be 
described as accountable in some sense. The informal regime is 
neither truly democratic nor consistent with the interest in 
predictability. On the democracy question, the very existence of 
illegal immigration directly contravenes the public’s preferences as 
formally expressed in statute, if not the public’s or the government’s 
de facto preferences. A regime that produces a level of immigration 
that exceeds the popularly determined optimal level embodied in the 
INA is difficult to characterize as true to principles of accountability. 
More important, illegal immigration produces undemocratic social 
conditions, primarily by generating a population of people 
substantially disabled as social actors.38 
With respect to predictability, the regime of illegal immigration 
clashes with the objective of having a transparent immigration policy. 
Indeed, the regime facilitates the broad exercise of nontransparent 
prosecutorial discretion and therefore generates uncertainty among 
immigrants and their employers. A key insight of The President and 
Immigration Law is that the executive possesses enormous control 
over the number (and to a lesser extent, the types) of immigrants in 
the United States through its power to determine whether and against 
whom to prosecute removal, even though the president has not been 
delegated formal authority to determine core immigration questions.39 
The most obvious example of this power exists as the result of illegal 
 
 37. For an argument that underenforcement can be a rational law enforcement strategy 
when the goal is to deter marginal offenders but not expend enormous resources on people who 
will violate the law anyway, see Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice 
Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 429–31 (2002). 
 38. For an elaboration of why illegal immigration produces undemocratic social conditions, 
see, for example, Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 536–37; Cristina M. Rodríguez & Ruth 
Rubio-Marín, The Constitutional Status of Irregular Migrants: Testing the Boundaries of Human 
Rights Protection in the United States and Spain, in WHO BELIEVES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
MIGRANTS (Marie Dembour & Tobias Kelley eds., forthcoming 2010). 
 39. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 510–19. 
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immigration:40 nearly twelve million unauthorized immigrants are 
present in the United States,41 each of whom is removable at the 
discretion of prosecutors in Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). Because ICE cannot possibly effectuate removal of even a 
majority of this population due to resource and political constraints, it 
must exercise discretion regarding whom to remove. ICE might 
choose to focus on aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes, on 
noncitizens who have filed complaints regarding labor violations or 
have demanded humane treatment too vociferously, or simply on 
immigrant workers (as opposed to unauthorized immigrants 
generally).42 
Little information ultimately exists, however, about how ICE 
exercises its discretion—whether it is making substantive decisions 
based on the criteria described above or acting randomly or 
episodically in response to political pressure—and that is precisely the 
problem. Though prosecutorial discretion is perfectly consistent with 
the rule of law, the scope of the executive’s discretion in this context 
is vast. The executive’s discretion is not subject to scrutiny to 
determine if the standards on which the executive relies comport with 
the priorities Congress has defined, align with priorities the public 
might have, or reflect the appropriate level of equanimity to 
unauthorized immigrants who have developed ties to the U.S. or who 
have done nothing wrong beyond violating the prohibition on their 
entrance.43 
Given how poorly the current system approximates the ideal 
decisionmaking structure outlined above, there is cause for an 
institutional redesign that would better promote the constellation of 
 
 40. In The President and Immigration Law, Professor Cox and I identify two other contexts 
in which this dynamic obtains. First, Congress has enumerated an increasingly long list of crimes 
and other acts that warrant removal of lawful immigrants, and ICE exercises prosecutorial 
discretion in determining when and whether to proceed against immigrants who have 
committed these violations. And, second, the law permits the executive (namely immigration 
judges) to exercise discretion in certain contexts to provide relief from removal—to exercise a 
kind of clemency in light of certain equitable factors such as family ties or exceptional hardships 
that might arise as the result of the alien’s removal. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 514–18. 
 41. JEFFREY S. PASSELL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at i–v (2009). 
 42. For an extended discussion of this dynamic, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 510–
14. 
 43. I recognize that this fact alone may well justify their removal. The point is not that it is 
never appropriate to remove noncitizens who are present unlawfully, but that the executive has 
the power to pick and choose among those noncitizens—a power whose exercise should be 
rendered transparent. 
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values that mark a sound regulatory regime. For reasons explored in 
detail in Part II, a redesign that gives the executive the power to set 
ex ante admissions standards, to channel the streams of migration it 
either desires or cannot stop, would be an improvement over the 
status quo along each of the dimensions of flexibility, predictability, 
and democracy.44 Importantly, this delegation solution must be seen 
in relation to the status quo of congressional inaction and high levels 
of illegal immigration, not in comparison to a world in which 
executive enforcement can and does match quotas set by Congress. In 
other words, even if Congress is in the best position theoretically to 
set the ideal number of immigrants to be admitted in a given year,45 
this call for a rethinking of the current allocation of powers between 
the political branches responds to the realities generated in practice 
by the current allocation of decisionmaking authority.46 
But before proceeding to Part II and the discussion of 
institutional-design possibilities, it is crucial to underscore that the 
problem of prosecutorial discretion, in particular, requires more than 
a delegation solution. For reasons discussed in Part III, delegation 
may be inadequate to constrain prosecutorial discretion, because the 
executive may still have incentives to make core policy 
 
 44. For a leading policy proposal advocating delegation of new authority to an executive 
entity, see DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., HARNESSING 
THE ADVANTAGES OF IMMIGRATION FOR A 21ST-CENTURY ECONOMY: A STANDING 
COMMISSION ON LABOR MARKETS, ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND IMMIGRATION (2009), 
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/StandingCommission_May09.pdf. 
 45. I doubt very much that any such number exists, primarily because the “ideal” number 
of immigrants to admit will be a function of what immigration is supposed to accomplish (family 
reunification, reducing global poverty, enhancing economic competitiveness, or meeting 
humanitarian obligations to victims of natural or man-made disasters). In addition, a large 
number of different interests are at stake, such that multiple combinations of those interests 
could produce various sorts of second-best compromises that would be ideal in the sense of 
being politically achievable. The more important point is that the number of immigrants 
admitted ought to be allowed to fluctuate in response to changing labor-market needs, political 
pressures, and conditions outside the United States. The inability of the current allocation of 
powers to promote this sort of flexibility and regular resetting of priorities thus warrants a 
structural reorientation of decisionmaking power. 
 46. Importantly, this delegation is warranted whether the executive has deliberately 
enabled or simply cannot prevent illegal immigration. In addition, though the preceding 
discussion foregrounds reduction of illegal immigration and restraint of prosecutorial discretion 
as reasons for dissatisfaction with the current regime, the stasis problem can also be reframed as 
a rigidity that undermines competitiveness and economic dynamism. One leading proposal for a 
Standing Commission on Immigration that would involve the executive much more directly in 
setting visa policy highlights as a justification for the commission promoting U.S. 
competitiveness through the creation of a more nimble immigration bureaucracy as a 
justification for delegation. Id. at 2–4. 
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determinations through back-end, nonreviewable forms of screening. 
Any redesign should therefore incorporate other tools of the 
administrative state as potential mechanisms of restraint. The 
systematic and open use of cost-benefit analysis, for example, is well 
worth considering as a means of checking both enforcement 
discretion and the buildup of enforcement capacity. Whether the 
directive comes from Congress or the president, systematically and 
publicly accounting for and weighing the costs of enforcement plans 
and technology against the gains achieved (in terms of numbers of 
arrests and the economic and social value of arrests) can introduce 
the elements of rationality and transparency into the enforcement 
regime as a whole.47 The design solution I explore in Part II offers but 
one means, albeit a significant one, of addressing the limitations of 
the current decisionmaking regime. 
II.  DESIGN 
Advancing the objectives outlined in Part I—ensuring 
responsiveness to changing circumstances while creating a predictable 
and accountable regime—requires awareness of the pathologies that 
characterize the current allocation of authority between the branches. 
Those problems include stasis, illegal immigration, and back-end 
executive screening hidden from view. This Part considers how 
delegation of ex ante, standard-setting power to the executive might 
help ameliorate these problems. Section A considers the three 
decisionmakers in play—Congress, the president, and the 
bureaucracy—and their relative capabilities, virtues, and vices. 
Section B turns to an existing scheme of delegation in the 
immigration context—the refugee selection system—for evidence of 
how such delegation might work in practice. Section C lays out how 
delegation in the labor context might be structured, in light of the 
features of each of the relevant decisionmakers. 
A. The Decisionmakers 
Congress, the president, and the bureaucracy each have a role to 
play in the policymaking process. The allocation of power among 
 
 47. The budget devoted to enforcement measures has increased from $326.2 million in 1992 
to $2.7 billion in 2009, prompting the simple question of whether ratcheting up enforcement is 
worth its price. Building a Wall, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.economist.com/daily/ 
chartgallery/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15326722. 
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them depends in large part on how their characteristics align with the 
objectives of a particular regulatory regime. 
1. Institutional Characteristics.  Congress, which consists of 
hundreds of members standing in for hundreds of overlapping 
constituencies, represents the most broadly and deeply representative 
institution of government. Its consequent closeness to the people, 
understood as a disaggregated and diverse entity, gives Congress the 
strongest democratic pedigree of the institutional actors in play. Even 
if the president represents a national constituency by virtue of being 
popularly elected,48 the multimember nature of Congress provides 
broader and deeper representation of the diverse electorate’s 
interests. In addition, in Congress, deliberation over matters of public 
concern, though increasingly conducted in committees and 
subcommittees, is at its most transparent. 
But Congress’s failure to adjust admissions numbers with any 
regularity also suggests that the structure of congressional 
decisionmaking tends to give rise to stasis. Though Congress responds 
to public pressures, it is often slow to do so in an affirmative way by 
passing legislation (as opposed to by avoiding legislation and thus 
controversy). The political complications of representing many 
different constituencies likely contribute to the difficulty of 
legislating, but so does the cumbersome nature of the legislative 
process itself, which requires passing through numerous veto gates49 
and achieving consensus among a large number of actors with widely 
divergent preferences. The congressional decisionmaking process is 
thus ill suited to respond to regular fluctuations in social and 
economic conditions. 
Congress arguably has the capacity to gather and analyze the sort 
of data that would allow it to track such changes—it can order 
research studies and has the staff to consume them.50 But such fact-
 
 48. Cf. Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 24–25 (1994) (arguing that the president lacks the regional bias of 
Congress and therefore will be more likely to represent the median voter). 
 49. Cf. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11, 16–21 (1994) (“[A]ttempts to pass new 
legislation typically must navigate through numerous veto gates before even reaching the 
presidential approval/veto stage . . . .”). 
 50. As one scholar has emphasized, “Congress has chosen to legislate any number of 
seemingly complex issues. Where the incentive exists, legislators find the time and resources to 
deal with complexity.” Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative 
Authority, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175, 184–86 (Roger G. Noll 
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finding is arduous,51 and the incentives to displace casework or other 
more politically salient activity are likely limited. The sheer number 
of participants and multiple layers of negotiation and debate that the 
modern committee process has engendered make legislative reform 
protracted and difficult to see through to completion, though the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association has highlighted at least 
one example to the contrary in the labor immigration context.52 
In addition, when it comes to immigration issues, Congress may 
be particularly sensitive to what could be called identitarian 
concerns,53 which manifest themselves as a strong bias in public 
 
ed., 1985); see also Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 23–24 (1982) (noting that agency heads do not necessarily have greater expertise than 
committee and subcommittee chairs, suggesting that Congress can take on technical issues when 
it has reason to do so). 
 51. The difficulty of legislating is highlighted by the scholarly literature that contends that 
Congress’s motivation for delegating lawmaking authority to a bureaucracy is to reduce 
“legislative decision-making costs.” MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 44–45 (1995); see also 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131 (1980) 
(arguing that delegation arises from legislators’ lack of time and ability to express substantive 
disagreement by second-guessing administrative officials in hearings, because “it is simply 
easier, and it pays more visible political dividends, to play errand boy-cum-ombudsman than to 
play one’s part in a genuinely legislative process”); Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, 
Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 300–01 (2004) (arguing that delegation 
is driven by high information-gathering costs); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 98 (1985) (noting, in 
defense of delegation, that truly specific legislation is not achievable and that delegation permits 
the government to be responsive to diversity in voter preferences over time, as well as across the 
country—something nondelegating legislation cannot achieve, suggesting limitations to 
Congress’s ability to engage in fine-tuned regulation). 
 52. The American Immigration Lawyers Association has emphasized that American 
employers have been successful at convincing Congress on several occasions to increase total 
H1-B visa limits. The group feels that Congress is more responsive to the interests of its 
members than an independent commission might be. See AM. COUNCIL ON INT’L PERS., 
EXAMINING PROPOSALS TO CREATE A NEW COMMISSION ON EMPLOYMENT-BASED 
IMMIGRATION 12 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationworksusa.org/uploaded/file/ ACIP 
%20Commission%20Paper%20Final.pdf. It is possible that the legislative dynamic differs when 
it comes to temporary visa numbers, though temporary visas increasingly lead to permanent 
residence over time. More to the point, that Congress responds to particular constituencies is 
not surprising, but this fact does not change the antiquated nature of the employment-
immigration regime, nor does it address the rule-of-law problems with which I began. And a 
commission should in theory be responsive to the need for more H1-B workers, particularly if 
they present potential for long-term economic contributions. In truth, employers are loath to 
lose control over the admissions process. For other opposition to a commission proposal, see 
Immigration Works USA, An Immigration Commission?, http://www.immigrationworksusa.org/ 
index.php?p=193 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 53. For discussion of why the executive is more likely than Congress to be open to 
immigration, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 543 n.271. 
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opinion against increasing migration levels.54 A number of factors 
shape these concerns, including popular resistance to economic 
competition from migrants and the admission of people from distinct 
societies who might challenge the cultural cohesion of the country. 
Such worries may well be legitimate, and lawmakers should take 
them into account. But they nonetheless contribute to the 
congressional stasis that defines core immigration policy. Though 
these populist pressures do not often result in affirmative legislation 
restricting migration,55 they likely contribute significantly to legislative 
inaction. The political costs of engaging the immigration question can 
be high, but the benefits tend to be low, especially given that a major 
set of potential beneficiaries are noncitizens and therefore nonvoters. 
Even if some legislators anticipate political gain from pushing either 
expansionist or restrictionist sentiments, immigration debates 
historically have been protracted and not conducive to the formation 
of consensus.  
Conventional conceptions of the executive emphasize that the 
president moves with far more alacrity than Congress. He is better 
able to advance affirmative policy measures—through executive 
order or by directing agency policy—than his multimember 
counterpart in the legislative branch.56 As a result, the executive 
branch has greater structural capacity to be responsive to changing 
circumstances than does Congress.57 This responsiveness can cut two 
 
 54. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 36, at 20 (“81 percent of Americans oppose higher 
immigration—a level of opposition that contradicts the thrust of immigration political economy, 
which is decidedly expansionist.” (footnote omitted)). History suggests an upper limit exists on 
the number of immigrants the public is willing to admit—perhaps somewhere close to one 
million per year, including close family of U.S. citizens. When Congress enacted the 
immigration reforms of 1965, for example, the primary purpose of the reforms was to eliminate 
the national-origins quotas and permit the admission of immigrants from all countries on equal 
terms. But in selling this measure to Congress and skeptical Republicans, President Johnson, as 
well as the reform’s advocates in Congress, repeatedly emphasized that the reform would not 
increase the total number of immigrants, even as it dramatically changed the types of 
immigrants admitted. 
 55. Cf. id. (discussing the expansionist nature of immigration policy). 
 56. For a discussion of how the president directs agency policy, see generally Kagan, supra 
note 22. 
 57. See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 95 (“Strangely enough it may make sense to imagine the 
delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness 
of government to the desires of the electorate. . . . [Whereas constituents vote for congressmen 
to deliver goods and services to their districts, t]he president has no particular constituency to 
which he or she has special responsibility to deliver benefits. Presidents are hardly cut off from 
pork-barrel politics. Yet issues of national scope and the candidates’ positions on those issues 
are the essence of presidential politics. Citizens vote for a president based almost wholly on a 
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ways, however. Congress may be more populist, but its cumbersome 
decisionmaking mechanisms make it difficult for Congress to respond 
to populist pressures through affirmative lawmaking. The president, 
however, who is not immune to public pressure, particularly if he is in 
his first term, is much better situated to change policies in response to 
such pressure. A regime controlled by the president might therefore 
be highly flexible but also unpredictable. 
The increase in immigration enforcement activity during the late 
Bush and early Obama administrations reflects how the president’s 
sensitivity to public pressure can lead to dramatic swings in 
enforcement policy. In the case of the late Bush administration, the 
rise in enforcement activity may have been a response to the 
restrictionist public preferences that helped cause the demise of an 
immigration-reform package that included a legalization program. 
The early Obama administration’s emphasis on enforcement 
strategies could represent an effort to clear political space for 
immigration reform down the road by indicating to the public that the 
administration is tough on illegal immigration.58 
That said, the president is still more likely than Congress to 
adopt strategies that hew closely to facts on the ground because of the 
administrative apparatus at his disposal. Even if the president himself 
will be attentive to or controlled by identitarian interests because of 
his status as an elected official,59 the bureaucracy will not be nearly as 
susceptible to such pressures, because agency officials are not 
themselves subject to election (though political appointees present a 
different story). The bureaucracy is comparatively unaccountable,60 
though this insulation does not necessarily mean reliance on the 
bureaucracy is undemocratic.61 
 
perception of the difference that one or another candidate might make to general governmental 
policies.”). For further discussion of presidential control, see generally Kagan, supra note 22. 
 58. For a discussion of the shift in enforcement policy during the first year of the Obama 
administration, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 521. 
 59. For a discussion problematizing this point, see infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“Much maligned by both the 
political left and right, bureaucracy creates a civil service not beholden to any particular 
administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional worldview. These benefits 
have been obscured by the now-dominant, caricatured view of agencies as simple anti-change 
agents.”). 
 61. See Stephenson, supra note 24, at 55 (“Forcing the politically responsive president to 
share power with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the 
variance in policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory 
inertia that mutes the significance of variation in the president’s policy preferences. Up to a 
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The extent of the bureaucracy’s insulation likely depends on 
whether and how political appointees positioned at its helm control 
it.62 But it is not necessary to portray the bureaucracy in the New Deal 
spirit famously articulated by James Landis—as made up of 
disinterested technocrats applying scientific expertise to regulatory 
problems63—to establish that, relative to Congress and the president, 
the bureaucracy is less responsive to political pressure and more 
likely to incorporate technocratic modes of thought into its 
decisionmaking.64 To some degree, cultures of expertise-based 
problem solving exist within bureaucratic agencies. The bureaucracy 
is therefore the most likely of the actors involved to respond to 
changing circumstances with apolitical, data-based policies, with time 
horizons that extend beyond the next election or the state of the here-
and-now.65 Indeed, an agency can be expected to gather and analyze 
 
point, the benefit to a majority of voters from a reduction in outcome variance outweighs the 
cost associated with biasing the expected outcome away from the median voter’s ideal 
outcome.”). 
 62. See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 57 (1987) (arguing that 
distrust and hostility toward career bureaucrats are misplaced and that the high numbers of 
political appointees undermine the effectiveness of government); cf. David Fontana, 
Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 610–11 (2009) (noting that “American 
bureaucrats understand their role as much more political and much less technical than their 
counterparts in nonpresidential systems,” and that because of the rapid turnover among 
political appointees within the bureaucracy, “bureaucratic officials cannot form working 
relationships with their colleagues, and do not learn the idiosyncrasies of their policy 
portfolios”); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54–55 (noting that though “[e]very administration exerts some 
degree of political influence over agency decision making,” the Bush administration’s 
interference with the EPA, which included “altering scientific reports, silencing its own experts, 
and suppressing scientific information that was politically inconvenient,” were of a “different 
scope and scale than in the past”). 
 63. See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938) (describing 
administrative bureaucrats as “men of professional attainment . . . . bred to the facts”). 
 64. Cf. Fontana, supra note 62, at 611 (“But no one believes that bureaucrats, even in a 
perfectly designed system, either can or should be purely technical creatures implementing 
objectively neutral commands with the best available evidence. . . . Creating a European-style 
civil service for the entire federal bureaucracy is not a choice for a country that recognizes the 
need for political accountability over bureaucrats.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65. Katyal, supra note 60, at 2345 (“A chief advantage of bureaucracy is to maintain the 
long-term view. By articulating the prospective costs, an effective bureaucrat is able to refocus 
government questions away from the crisis du jour. . . . Wisdom requires tradition-bound 
professionalism and the realization that future generations will feel the effects of earlier 
politicians’ decisions.”); Pfiffner, supra note 62, at 60 (arguing that whereas political appointees 
rarely stay longer than the president who appointed them, career bureaucrats do stay longer, 
which “causes them to pay attention to the health of institutions and to the integrity of the 
processes that assure nonpartisan implementation of the laws”). 
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complex data from multiple sources and then assess the data through 
social-scientific mechanisms, rather than through the primarily 
political and outcome-driven lenses that filter legislative fact-finding.66 
Admittedly, the familiar problem of ossification caused by procedural 
requirements and layers of judicial review can beset the bureaucracy, 
thus undermining its supposed policymaking advantages,67 but 
scholars have challenged both the extent to which ossification occurs 
and the assumption that it has negative consequences for 
policymaking.68 Further, through design, institutional features that 
may threaten ossification, such as excessive court review and 
procedural requirements that lead to protracted or failed rulemaking, 
can be controlled. 
 
 66. See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 44, at 9 (discussing the lack of “systematic, 
wide-ranging, and ‘just-in-time’ research results the government often requires” and explaining 
how a “properly staffed body” would coordinate existing research and generate its own policy-
relevant research); see also id. at 13 (emphasizing the limitations of shortage analyses that focus 
only on labor market shortages, which are hard to predict and invariably change as 
administrative processes for admission run their course, such that admissions always lag behind 
labor market needs). One important question in the data-gathering process is the extent to 
which employers ought to have input into setting visa levels. The current system, which relies on 
employers to petition for workers based on employer needs, embodies the assumption that 
private actors are more likely to screen effectively than the government, which is removed a 
step from the labor market. See Lee, supra note 33, at 1115–16 (arguing that employers are 
better suited than the government to conduct thorough ex ante screening of high-skilled 
workers). 
 67. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
225–54 (1990) (discussing judicial review issues in the context of auto safety regulation); 
Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 726–30 (2007) 
(summarizing the ossification debate and suggesting that adding layers of procedure and judicial 
review on to the production of guidance documents will eliminate the utility of such documents 
to an agency seeking to escape ossification); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the 
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 549–50 
(1997) (arguing that hard look review ultimately encourages judges to replace agencies’ 
judgments with untechnocratic policy judgments); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–62, 71–93 (1995) (analyzing the problem of 
ossification and suggesting solutions). 
 68. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through 
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (2000) (arguing based on an empirical 
survey of D.C. Circuit decisions over ten years that losing judicial challenges did not seriously 
impede agencies’ abilities to pursue their policy goals); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A 
Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 253–54, 265–
67, 286, 301–02 (2009) (arguing that hard look judicial review does not necessarily impose extra 
costs upon society because a number of features of administrative bodies also function to 
discourage aggressive rulemaking, and that the hard look doctrine may actually increase wise 
rulemaking). 
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2. The Argument for Delegation.  Given these basic features of 
the three actors in the decisionmaking triad, the question becomes: 
who should be given what power? At the very least, any redesign 
should end the congressional monopoly on core immigration policy, 
addressing stasis by introducing greater flexibility into the 
decisionmaking process. An administrative agency, as a structural 
matter, is better equipped than Congress to take into account factors 
that require expertise and speed to discern. And, crucially for the 
immigration context, an executive decisionmaker—particularly the 
president, but also the agencies within the executive branch—is more 
likely to include the issue’s international dimension in its analysis 
than Congress, whose debates routinely focus on the domestic 
context.69 
Delegation would also make possible a greater degree of 
regularized, data-driven analysis. A system redesign should give the 
bureaucracy, in particular, a much more significant role in the visa-
policy–making process than it has under the status quo, in part by 
expanding the capacities of the existing bureaucracy to generate 
policy-relevant analysis. Delegation in a manner that promotes such 
data-gathering would leverage the advantages of the administrative 
state to improve the quality of immigration policy. The move toward 
delegation, thus, should not be seen as an aggrandizement of 
executive power over matters related to foreign affairs, but rather as 
an extension of the basic principles of administrative law and design 
to a new context in which the advantages of an administrative process 
could be significant. The congressional model embodies the 
presumption that core immigration policy should reflect the 
preferences of the domestic political process. Though this 
presumption is not inappropriate, it should not determine the design 
 
 69. For a discussion of this conceptual problem and citation of literature discussing the 
importance of taking into account the nondomestic factors that produce migration, see generally 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Building Capacity for the Transnational Regulation of Migration, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2010), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/ 
sidebar/volume/110/1_Rodriguez.pdf. This tendency of the executive can be explained not just 
by the fact that economic migration has foreign policy consequences, but also by the likelihood 
that the executive will be more aware of and attuned to conditions beyond the United States’ 
borders, and able and willing to address transnational issues through state-to-state dialogue, 
bilateral accords, and executive agreements. Historical examples abound of the executive 
engaging the foreign dimension of migration directly, through diplomatic and other channels. 
For a discussion of the Bracero Accords, perhaps the best twentieth-century example of this 
phenomenon, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 485–92. 
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of the regime, because immigration policy should also be responsive 
to the factors that produce migration.70 
Ending the congressional monopoly on core immigration policy 
would help address the problem of excessive prosecutorial discretion 
by achieving vertical integration within the executive branch. By 
giving the executive power to set ex ante visa standards, delegation 
would make it possible for the executive to shift resources from 
enforcement actions to admissions determinations, which in turn 
would make the executive’s immigration decisions subject to scrutiny. 
As Part III discusses in more detail, the power of vertical integration 
to address the discretion problem depends in large part on whether 
the executive would actually engage in a shift, which in turn depends 
on whether the executive would prefer to channel migration ex ante 
or ex post. Ensuring that vertical integration functions to improve 
transparency will also require congressional and other forms of 
monitoring. But even if the shift to ex ante decisionmaking does not 
entirely eliminate ex post screening, the substantial benefits of such a 
shift and the pathologies of the status quo support experimenting with 
new approaches to institutional design. 
Another advantage to be gleaned from making the admissions 
process more flexible and responsive to migration realities through 
delegation would be the introduction of periodicity into the system, 
or the creation of the structural capacity for periodic updating of 
quota numbers. As a value, periodicity guards against a law’s 
obsolescence or increasing mismatch with the world it regulates—a 
key problem with today’s admissions processes, as discussed in Part I. 
At the same time, emphasizing periodicity would require trading off 
constancy, as well as some predictability and clear notice to 
employers, workers, and others about what to expect from the 
regulatory regime. 
The fact that an executive agency charged with setting visa 
numbers might change those numbers on an annual basis could 
 
 70. See COLTON C. CAMPBELL, DISCHARGING CONGRESS: GOVERNMENT BY 
COMMISSION 113–28 (2002) (discussing the creation of the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission to overcome the political impossibility of closing military bases). The Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission may not be exactly on point, because most members of Congress 
apparently agreed that a certain number of bases needed to be closed but that Congress could 
not accomplish the task because legislators would be unable to support the closure of bases in 
their jurisdictions. With respect to immigration, on the other hand, such consensus is largely 
absent. That said, the example does underscore the value of delegation as a means of breaking 
through legislative impasse, and most members of Congress probably do consider the 
immigration regime in need of reform. 
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account for the strong opposition to delegation from employer 
lobbies, who probably fear that visa streams will be cut off or 
diminished in an unpredictable fashion. These interests might prefer 
to lock a secure number of visas into a legislative bargain.71 One of the 
key challenges, then, in designing a labor visa agency or commission 
will be to ensure that employers and other important interests have 
the incentive and ability to predict changes in policy in a manner that 
allows them to go about their business. For the reasons discussed in 
Part I, flexibility and predictability need not be completely at odds. 
But even when they are, the virtue of the administrative process 
relative to the legislative process is that the former can continuously 
balance these competing objectives, recalibrating the balance in 
response to policy outcomes. 
But even if delegation successfully introduces greater flexibility 
into the system, policymakers must still weigh that flexibility against 
the potential loss of accountability or responsiveness to public 
opinion (as opposed to responsiveness to changing empirical 
circumstances). As discussed in more detail in Section C below, this 
concern for accountability justifies building congressional controls 
into the model, and may also determine the choice between creating 
an executive agency or an independent commission. But the more 
important points at this stage are not only that the administrative 
process has its democratic side,72 but also that a key question 
 
 71. The American Council on International Personnel, for example, has emphasized that a 
commission would make unpredictable annual adjustments to employment-based immigration 
levels without necessarily taking employers’ workforce needs into account—a situation of 
particular concern to employers accustomed to Congress’s slower-moving, employer-responsive 
processes. AM. COUNCIL ON INT’L PERS., supra note 52, at 13. A similar dynamic appeared 
during debates over the 1980 Refugee Act. One central issue was whether to set numerical 
limits on refugee admissions in the statute, or to delegate authority to the executive to 
determine those numbers on an annual basis—the form the law ultimately took. Leading 
supporters in Congress of creating a stable refugee regime, as well as refugee advocacy groups, 
advocated inclusion of a fixed number of annual refugee admissions in the statute to ensure that 
the president did not have the power to reduce refugee admissions below an acceptable 
threshold, or eliminate them altogether. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The 
Forty-Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 25 
(1981). 
 72. The literature on presidential control emphasizes the president’s national constituency 
and democratic bona fides. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 545 (“Whereas the intensity 
of regional preferences can allow a minority coalition to block reform in Congress, the President 
through the administrative process is arguably better positioned to effectively balance 
competing interests, such as the interests of employers, labor, and immigrants themselves. Of 
course, whether we can conclude that the President is more accountable to the people than 
Congress depends on to whom accountability should run . . . .”); Kagan, supra note 22, at 2334; 
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implicated in the design of regulatory structures is how to identify the 
optimal balance between insulation and political control, given that 
the structures should also promote efficiency and effectiveness.73 In 
other words, as advanced in Part I, accountability is important, but 
policymakers must balance that value not only with the need for a 
more data-driven policy, but also with rule-of-law values that require 
more than appealing to the public’s immediate preferences.  
Delegation in the immigration context advances this balancing 
effort, largely because of the nature of the problem identified in 
Part I. Even if Congress is in the best position to determine the ideal 
number of immigrants to admit, or its decisions are the most 
legitimate from a democratic perspective, history suggests, at least 
with respect to low-skilled labor, that the choice is not between 
keeping immigration numbers low through congressionally imposed 
limitations and pushing them ever-higher through an executive-driven 
process. Rather, the question is whether the United States would 
prefer a mostly legal system or a hybrid legal-illegal system. Will the 
executive be willing or able to exercise its discretion to enforce the 
law in a way that keeps illegal immigration to negligible numbers? If 
history suggests that this enforcement level can be difficult to achieve, 
are democracy and rule-of-law values better served by keeping in 
place the institutional arrangements that have allowed the illegal 
immigration regime to arise, or should policymakers develop 
structural alternatives to ensure that as much immigration as possible 
is legal? 
Section C addresses the question of how much insulation from 
the political process is desirable in immigration policy and how 
Congress can introduce mechanisms of accountability to the public 
into the design of an agency. But even in the face of strong 
accountability claims, the existing dynamics of the immigration 
regime underscore that some insulation from politics is necessary. 
Delegation of some sort will contribute to the production of an 
admissions policy more attuned to changing conditions and therefore 
more likely to strike at the pathologies referred to in Part I. 
 
Moe & Wilson, supra note 48, at 11. For a challenge to the view that the president represents a 
more national constituency, see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the 
Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231–42 (2006). 
 73. See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice in Public Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 7 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell eds., forthcoming 2010). 
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The move toward delegation in a politically charged context has 
an analogue in the criminal justice arena, in which scholars and 
reformers in the 1980s advocated the creation of a judicial agency—
the Sentencing Commission, eventually established in 1984 by the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act74—because they “did not trust the 
political process on its own to produce rational sentencing policy in a 
tough-on-crime culture.”75 The structure of an immigration agency 
would differ substantially from the Sentencing Commission, in large 
part because the separation of powers dynamic would be distinct, 
given that an immigration agency would involve power sharing 
between the legislative and executive branches, whereas the 
Sentencing Commission affects judges.76 But the reasons underlying 
the Commission’s creation are instructive in the immigration context 
nonetheless, because the Guidelines represent a turn to delegation as 
a means of addressing certain perverse effects of the political 
process.77 
B. The Refugee Act as Parallel 
Before answering the design question in more detail, it bears 
emphasizing that the delegation of ex ante standard-setting authority 
to the executive is not unprecedented. In 1980, Congress passed the 
Refugee Act,78 which delegated to the president the power to 
 
 74. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 
1976, 2017–26 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)). 
 75. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 715 (2005). For a brief 
history of the Sentencing Guidelines, emphasizing their role in providing certainty and fairness 
in sentencing by reducing disparity, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
general/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf. 
 76. It is also important to note that judges famously have bristled at the constraints the 
Guidelines placed on their discretion, and the Supreme Court recently declared the Guidelines 
advisory in a highly contested decision. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
The Court has nevertheless continued to stress that judges must consult the Guidelines in 
sentencing. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007); Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 51–55 (2007). The constitutional reasons for the Court’s decision—the fact that the 
Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges, to find facts that increase a defendant’s sentence 
above the statutory maximum—simply do not obtain in the immigration context. The President 
and Immigration Law, Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, is devoted to demonstrating that no 
formal constitutional restraints exist on the executive’s authority to set core immigration policy. 
 77. See Barkow, supra note 75, at 715 (arguing that the agency model can succeed in the 
sentencing context but that it will be “more efficacious” if it is “politically enmeshed” and 
operates largely like an interest group). 
 78. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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determine the number of refugees to be admitted each year and gave 
the president the authority to delegate substantive screening decisions 
to lower-level executive officials.79 Existing law thus contemplates 
executive-driven screening; the agency or commission proposed in 
this Article could be understood, in fact, as a labor-based complement 
to a regime that already exists. When considering the design of a new 
labor regime, then, the details of the refugee system offer useful 
points of comparison, as well as cautionary tales. 
In the Refugee Act of 1980 (the Act), Congress replaced an ad 
hoc regime of refugee admissions, determined largely through 
presidential exercise of the parole power80 without congressional 
consultation, with a clear procedure for the annual admission of 
overseas refugees that explicitly incorporated congressional 
participation.81 The Act delegates to the president the authority to 
determine the number of refugees to be admitted each year.82 In the 
years 1980, 1981, and 1982, the ceilings could not exceed fifty 
thousand, unless the president determined humanitarian concerns 
required otherwise.83 But in the years since, no numerical restrictions 
have applied, and the Act gives the president the power to adjust 
numbers set at the start of the fiscal year in response to unforeseen 
refugee situations.84 The statute also requires that the president, 
before setting the annual numbers, engage in “appropriate 
consultation” with the judiciary committees of both houses of 
Congress, through in-person communication initiated by cabinet-level 
officials.85 The transcripts of these consultations are published in the 
 
 79. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157–59 (2006). 
 80. For a discussion of the president’s historical use of the parole power and the way in 
which the Refugee Act responded to what Congress deemed to be the president’s misuse of 
power, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 501–05. 
 81. For a contemporaneous, comprehensive account of the legislative history of the 
Refugee Act of 1980, including a discussion of efforts to create statutory mechanisms that would 
address conflict between Congress and the executive over refugee-admissions standards, see 
Anker & Posner, supra note 71, at 30, which also notes that balancing calls for broad executive 
authority against demands for congressional control and statutory consultation was a “pervasive 
theme throughout [the] six-year debate” on the Act. 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1157. 
 83. Id. § 1157(a)(1). 
 84. Id. § 1157(a)(2). 
 85. Id. § 1157(d). The executive branch must provide Congress with a description of the 
nature of the refugee situation, a description of the number and allocation of the refugees to be 
admitted, and an analysis of conditions within the countries from which they came, as well as an 
analysis of the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impacts of their admission to the 
United States. Id. § 1157(e). The cabinet-level officials typically involved in the consultation 
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Congressional Record, and the State Department also must submit a 
report to Congress on the proposed numbers.86 Finally, once the 
president has set the maximum number of refugees and allocated that 
number among countries or regions of the world, the attorney general 
coordinates the selection of individual applicants.87 
Though the Act was passed before the Supreme Court struck 
down the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha,88 the Act never contained 
a provision for congressional veto of the president’s determinations. 
That said, during the drafting process, the question of whether to 
include the veto proved to be a significant source of contention.89 The 
House and Senate disagreed considerably over how much 
congressional control to relinquish, with the House advocating 
returning to Congress the power to admit refugees, and leaders in the 
Senate seeking “to maintain the flexibility of the admission 
procedures and not compromise that flexibility by imposing rigid 
congressional control mechanisms.”90 
 
included the attorney general, the secretary of state, the U.S. coordinator for refugees—a 
position the statute created, requiring confirmation by the Senate—an HHS representative, and, 
before its dismantling, the commissioner of the old INS. 
 86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2009: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at ii (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/113507.pdf (noting that President Bush signed into law a provision that 
broadens the discretionary authority of the executive branch to exempt aliens from terrorism 
bars related to admission); id. at iii–iv (creating new access categories for Iraqi refugees and 
citing increased attention to the plight of Iraqi refugees); id. at 19 tbl.II (listing recommended 
ceilings, including 37,000 from Near East and South Asia, 4,500 from Latin America, 19,000 
from East Asia, 2,500 from Europe and Central Asia, and 12,000 from Africa); id. at 20–48 
(listing reasons for allocation, with an emphasis on religious freedom); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET 
AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 9 
(2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74762.pdf (listing three 
priority levels, with first priority being individual referrals with compelling protection needs for 
whom no other durable solution exists, second priority being groups of special humanitarian 
concern for the United States, and third priority involving family reunification). 
 87. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c). 
 88. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
 89. See Anker & Posner, supra note 71, at 58 (recounting congressional testimony in favor 
of the legislative veto amendment suggesting that it would return “control over admission of 
aliens to the Congress, the branch of government that is given sole control over immigration by 
the Constitution” (quoting 125 CONG. REC. 12,374–75 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish)); id. at 59 
(recounting the argument that the legislative veto would establish the principle that “Congress, 
as a whole, will establish immigration policy for the country in an informed and open manner” 
(quoting 125 CONG. REC. 12,020 (1979) (statement of Sen. Huddleston))); id. at 63 (noting that 
the major issue during House debates on the Conference Bill was the failure to include a 
legislative veto provision). 
 90. Id. at 50. 
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Congress ultimately chose to delegate authority in the Refugee 
Act for at least two reasons that resonate in the labor context. First, 
the international refugee situation fluctuates dramatically in response 
to natural disasters and political developments abroad, thus 
warranting delegation to take advantage of the executive’s alacrity 
and foreign affairs expertise relative to Congress.91 Though the 
economic factors that contribute to the fluctuation of migration flows 
may not change as rapidly as the conditions that give rise to refugees 
or require as much foreign affairs expertise to discern, economic 
factors fluctuate more regularly than Congress appears willing or able 
to account for. And though the president might have greater relative 
expertise in foreign affairs than in judging the interaction of 
international economic conditions and domestic labor interests—an 
area in which Congress could have the upper hand—the need to look 
abroad to regulate economic migration, and the executive’s greater 
capacity for responsiveness to changing conditions, cut in favor of 
executive involvement. 
Second, the Refugee Act represented an effort to control the 
discretion the president had exerted historically over the admission of 
refugees.92 As explained in The President and Immigration Law, 
presidents since at least Eisenhower had been using the parole 
authority to admit thousands of immigrants without congressional 
pre-approval.93 With the Refugee Act, Congress sought to systematize 
that practice and bring it under congressional scrutiny by requiring 
the president to submit his annual determinations to Congress. On 
 
 91. See id. at 35–37 (discussing State Department opposition to numerical limits to preserve 
the capacity to respond flexibly to crises and the eventual compromise with Congress—some of 
whose members favored numerical restrictions—to balance flexibility with congressional 
controls); David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT’L 
LEGAL STUD. 91, 99 (1982) (“Members of Congress . . . wanted refugee programs to be flexible, 
so as to meet new crises effectively.”). 
 92. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19–20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 161–62 (explaining Congress’s checks on the president’s discretion); S. REP. 
NO. 96-256, at 1–2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141–42; see also Anker & Posner, 
supra note 71, at 27–31 (discussing congressional discomfort with the use of the parole power); 
Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 146 (1981) 
(“Another concern in Congress was the use of the Attorney General’s ‘parole authority’. I felt 
that Congress had provided ample approval and constitutional justification for the authority. 
Many disagreed, however, and the issue was of deep concern to many in Congress, especially in 
the House of Representatives. One of the principal arguments for the Act was that it would 
bring the admission of refugees under greater Congressional authority and statutory control and 
eliminate the need to use the parole authority.”). 
 93. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 501–05. 
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the surface, then, because Congress designed the new regime to 
constrain the president, the direction of congressional control 
suggested by the Refugee Act may seem to run in the opposite 
direction of the position advocated in this Article, because the Act 
sought to constrain the president. But the delegation of ex ante 
screening authority in the Act offered a means of addressing overly 
broad prosecutorial discretion through the creation of a transparent 
regime—one of the dynamics the delegation proposed in this Article 
would promote. 
A wholesale adoption of the refugee selection model in the labor 
context would be inappropriate, given the differences in regulatory 
context—primarily that effective regulation of labor migration 
requires more data-driven analysis and less foreign affairs judgment 
than refugee admissions, two factors that warrant less presidential 
control in the labor context. Even in the refugee context, scholars 
such as Professor Stephen Legomsky have criticized the system for 
giving the president too much control, which has resulted in refugee 
admissions that reflect the president’s foreign policy agenda at the 
expense of humanitarian concerns, reflected in the long-standing 
preference for refugees from communist regimes over other deserving 
refugee populations.94  
Such influence is not necessarily illegitimate, if the president’s 
agenda reflects what he was elected to accomplish or the president’s 
actions are viewed as democratic because of his election. But the 
more important point is that the structure of the refugee regime 
prioritizes direct presidential control, and overweening control by the 
president would undermine the objective of introducing technocratic-
 
 94. Stephen H. Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of 
Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675, 701, 708–13 (1995); see also LAWYERS 
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A 
DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 2 (1990) available at http://attorneynelson.com/sitebuildercontent/ 
sitebuilderfiles/LCHRRefugeeDecadeReport.pdf (noting that the humanitarian purpose has 
been “subverted by political considerations,” with foreign policy dominating refugee admissions 
such that the vast majority of those admitted were “from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and 
Indochina”); id. at 10–11 (noting that ideological and geographical bias in asylum adjudications 
stems from flaws in the implementation of the Refugee Act, including DOJ’s failure to 
promulgate comprehensive administrative criteria to interpret the standards in the Act, leaving 
too much discretion to immigration judges); Anker & Posner, supra note 71, at 69–70 
(documenting that in the early years of the regime, the Carter administration allocated very few 
visas to refugees from Africa or Latin America, outside Cuba); cf. Matthew E. Price, 
Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference for Persecuted People, 47 HARV. 
INT’L. L.J. 413, 418 (2006) (identifying humanitarian and political conceptions of asylum and 
advocating a focus on political conception). 
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style decisionmaking into core immigration policy determinations to 
complement (but not offset) the political framework that dominates 
the current structure. Indeed, Congress’s role in the refugee system, 
though designed to check unfettered executive discretion, arguably 
has amounted to nominal participation involving little direct control 
over the policy decision of whom to admit.95 The politics of the labor-
migration issue may ultimately demand more congressional control, 
again because labor migration does not sit as close to the heart of the 
president’s traditional foreign affairs powers. But despite the flaws in 
the refugee model, the regime’s existence does underscore that 
executive involvement in setting admissions numbers fits within 
existing conceptions of the separation of powers, suggesting room for 
reforms along similar lines in other parts of the immigration regime. 
C. Agency Structure 
Whether an agency or commission offers a politically attractive 
reform option or dramatically improves the process of immigrant 
screening without inappropriately displacing popular control over 
admissions decisions depends in large part on how the agency is 
designed.96 This Section surveys the key design questions that must be 
addressed, providing some preliminary answers. The key task of the 
agency will be to set the number of labor immigration visas to be 
issued each year.97 The two most important design questions will be: 
 
 95. Arnold Liebowitz, a former special counsel to the Selection Commission on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy and special counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy, has offered this view of how congressional consultation works: 
“The way this works is that the Executive Branch puts forth a number. The Congress then has 
consultations in relevant committees, both in the House and Senate, and then the Executive 
Branch goes and does what it wants. At least, that is the congressional view of the system.” 
Symposium, Challenges in Immigration Law and Policy: An Agenda for the Twenty-First 
Century, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 467, 473 (1994) (comments of Arnold Liebowitz) 
(citations omitted). Even if Congress were able to influence the ceiling numbers, the number of 
refugees the attorney general actually admits often falls well below the allocated numbers. See 
DAVID A. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 
PROGRAM: REFORMS FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 36 (2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf. 
 96. For an excellent and comprehensive synthesis of the public choice literature exploring 
agency-design questions, see Gersen, supra note 73. 
 97. Other topics for consideration are implicit in this very general mandate, such as 
whether the president or the agency should set ceilings and delegate power to other executive 
branch actors to screen among applicants in a pool for actual admission, as is the case with the 
refugee regime, or whether the agency should set the numbers and conduct the allocations itself 
on a rolling basis. Should the agency supplant the entire employment-based system with respect 
to both permanent and temporary workers? The justifications for delegation explored in Part I 
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(1) whether the agency should be an independent agency or 
commission, or an executive agency—a question that involves 
determining the optimal level of insulation from politics that would 
ensure the agency’s effective performance and legitimacy, and 
(2) how Congress should oversee the agency’s work.98 Other 
important questions, such as whether forms of public or White House 
oversight should be built into the regime, should also be taken into 
consideration. Each of the existing mechanisms of control has its 
virtues as a means of ensuring accountability, transparency, and 
effectiveness, so this Section discusses many design possibilities. But 
lawmakers designing the agency must be careful not to weigh it down 
with so many different forms of oversight that it becomes difficult for 
the agency to do its job. The following analysis, therefore, represents 
a menu of options, rather than a fixed list of features. 
Though this Section focuses on the procedural and structural 
aspects of the agency’s design, the substance of the agency’s statutory 
mandate will also affect the balance of insulation and accountability 
and will determine the scope of the agency’s authority, requiring a 
preliminary consideration of what, precisely, Congress should direct 
the agency to do. The framework statute for the agency could place 
significant substantive constraint on the agency’s activity by setting 
ceilings on the number of immigrants admitted in a given year. But 
such ex ante constraint would run counter to the reasons for 
 
do not suggest any reason to delegate in one area and not the other, which then raises the 
question of how many and what types of visas the agency would issue—lawful permanent 
resident visas versus temporary visas. Should the statute specify a proportion in which the 
agency should allocate those categories? Should the agency apply a ceiling to one stream but 
not the other? 
  Another way to enhance congressional involvement would be for the executive to serve 
primarily in an advisory role, recommending labor visa numbers annually that Congress could 
choose to adopt to replace the status quo or a number fixed in the statute. Even a purely 
advisory committee might act as a prompt to congressional action by doing some of Congress’s 
work for it. By gathering data and issuing regular recommendations, even an advisory agency 
would produce empirically informed contributions to what should be an ongoing debate and 
give Congress a leg up on the fact-finding process. If the obstacles to congressional action are 
primarily political and structural, however, a board or commission that lacks decisionmaking 
power will just produce make-work. Ultimately, the refugee-selection system offers one model 
for executive decisionmaking complemented by congressional oversight, and its key feature is 
the opportunity it creates for adjustment of numbers on an annual basis by an actor within the 
executive branch well placed to identify and respond to changed conditions in a comparatively 
swift manner. 
 98. For a discussion of how to negotiate this divide through institutional design in the 
criminal justice context, see Barkow, supra note 75, at 798–812. 
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delegation,99 because it would functionally replicate the status quo. 
Another option would entail having Congress set a statutory 
minimum or target, rather than authorizing the president to act 
unilaterally. Congress could then delegate power to the president or 
the agency to determine whether to depart upward from this number. 
This default approach could guard against agency failure to regulate 
by ensuring that a minimum number of labor entrants are permitted 
each year. But such statutory defaults could quickly become de facto 
ceilings and could reduce the agency’s incentives to conduct the sort 
of data-gathering and analysis needed to ensure that annual visa 
allocations respond to changing circumstances. 
A meaningful departure from the status quo in service of the 
objectives outlined in Part I would require Congress to authorize the 
agency to set actual visa numbers. In delegating this standard-setting 
authority, Congress must lay out “intelligible principle[s]”100 to guide 
the rulemaking process—principles that provide a framework for 
agency decisionmaking but are sufficiently open-ended to permit the 
agency’s determinations to change in response to evolving 
circumstances. The statute should require that the agency set 
admissions standards requisite to meet the country’s labor market 
needs, promote the public interest, and ensure the orderly flow of 
labor migration. This latter requirement, in particular, would task the 
agency with the responsibility of taking a holistic approach to setting 
standards by focusing not simply on short-term labor shortages, but 
also on the multiple and long-term factors that contribute to labor 
migration. The statute could give greater content to these principles 
by directing the agency to reasonably balance a nonexclusive list of 
factors, including current labor shortages and predicted future labor 
market needs, potential for economic growth and job creation, the 
impact of immigration on the wages of U.S. workers, and the 
likelihood of future illegal immigration in the absence of legal 
avenues for entry. By creating a nonexclusive list, Congress would 
ensure that other relevant but perhaps more controversial factors, 
such as the interests of intending migrants and the economic and 
 
 99. See Gersen, supra note 73, at 11 (citing literature suggesting that ex ante mechanisms of 
control will be suboptimal when cheap ex post mechanisms of control exist as substitutes). 
 100. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[W]e repeatedly have 
said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is 
directed to conform.’” (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
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social factors that motivate migration from other countries, namely 
Mexico, could be taken into account.101 
1. Independent Versus Executive Agency.  The threshold 
structural question to be answered is to what extent the president 
himself should be involved in agency decisionmaking. In an early 
assessment of the refugee selection system, David Martin emphasized 
that the refugee admission scheme had not gotten off the ground 
because it was subject to incompatible demands. Members of 
Congress and the public demanded that programs be flexible “to 
meet new crises effectively” but insisted at the same time on avoiding 
surprises, thus expressing preferences for “planning and control.”102 
One way to break through these incompatible demands might be 
to establish an independent agency, which would be capable of acting 
with speed in response to changed circumstances, but which also 
might be sufficiently insulated from direct presidential involvement to 
prevent politically motivated decisionmaking by the president or his 
political appointees from producing surprises. Though no single 
definition of an independent agency exists,103 such agencies tend to be 
defined by restraints on the president’s authority to hire and fire their 
members, primarily through requirements that the agencies be 
structured as multimember commissions whose members may only be 
dismissed for cause, serve staggered terms, and include 
representatives from both political parties. In theory, an agency 
insulated from presidential control through one or more of these 
features would be more likely than an agency controlled directly by 
the president to make objectively informed determinations that 
affected parties can easily anticipate and scrutinize. Though the above 
factors represent the most commonly recognized indicia of 
independence, other considerations, such as whether Congress 
establishes the agency or commission as free-standing or within an 
already existing executive entity, and more ephemeral factors, such as 
personal ties to the president,104 affect independence, as well. 
 
 101. For a discussion of the forms of data that the agency ought to gather, see 
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 44, at 13. 
 102. Martin, supra note 91, at 99. 
 103. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and 
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (2000) (“There is no 
general, all-purpose statutory or judicial definition of ‘independent agency.’”). 
 104. See Kagan, supra note 22, at 2376. 
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Scholars have advocated a move toward independence in the 
refugee context to preserve the advantages of flexibility while 
reducing the role of presidentially driven politics, primarily to ensure 
that the refugee system does not sacrifice humanitarian goals to 
foreign policy objectives.105 Similarly, a leading proposal to create a 
standing commission on labor migration emphasizes independent, 
data-based judgment and expertise as the animating criteria for a new 
system of labor migration and calls for the creation of an independent 
agency whose members, removable only for cause, would serve 
staggered terms and be balanced between the political parties.106 A 
turn to an independent agency would thus place the expertise 
justification at the center of the design, on the theory that 
independence would make it difficult for political actors of any kind 
to control the numbers that the agency ultimately sets.107 
Commentators have vigorously challenged this conception of the 
independent agency as insulated from political control in at least two 
ways. First, numerous scholars have emphasized that the 
“independence” of independent agencies has been overstated.108 The 
president’s power to appoint members, even in the face of 
 
 105. See Legomsky, supra note 94, at 708–13 (advocating the creation of an independent 
commission to allocate refugee visas, thereby addressing the problem of politically motivated 
decisionmaking). 
 106. See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 44, at 15 (noting that “[t]he Attorney General 
and Secretaries of Homeland Security, Labor, State, Commerce, Health and Human Services, 
and Agriculture should be ex officio members”). 
 107. Other factors in the agency structure that would be particularly pertinent to the 
objectives outlined here include determining who will be regarded as an expert for staffing 
purposes and whether this agency will compete with the Department of Labor or other agencies 
for jurisdiction, which may lead its members to align themselves with interest groups, thus 
politicizing the process. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control 
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 104 (1992) (discussing these structural 
questions in the context of arguing that dictating agency structure is one of the most effective 
ways of controlling policy drift). 
 108. See Breger & Edles, supra note 103, at 1162 (arguing that although independent 
agencies have “several tools” to resist executive will, “[a] vigilant President will make it more 
difficult for an agency to effectuate its own policies”); Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are 
Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 252 (“The basic question . . . is, how 
independent are independent agencies? The answer, it seems to me, is ‘not very.’”); see also 
Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency 
Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (noting that the fact that the solicitor general 
defends the positions of independent agencies before the Supreme Court gives the executive 
significant control over the development of law in independent agencies); cf. Aranson, supra 
note 50, at 26 (arguing that regulatory issues cannot be depoliticized and “[i]f transfers involve 
political questions about public policy, then there is no reason to expect that politics will 
disappear”). 
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bipartisanship requirements, coupled with the president’s ability to 
apply informal pressures to the agency, result in considerable 
executive control.109 The combination of these powers suggests that 
the choice of whether to create an independent or executive agency 
to channel labor migration may be less consequential than it seems at 
first glance. If policymakers seek insulation from executive whim, 
then the question becomes how to build in congressional and other 
controls to promote decisionmaking that, even if not apolitical, at 
least takes into account more than the president’s preferences. 
Another line of thought holds that independent agencies 
accomplish precisely this goal of disabling the president through the 
maintenance of congressional control. By creating an independent 
agency, Congress actually protects its own territory. On this theory, 
independent agencies do not introduce Congress directly into the 
decisionmaking picture, but they constrain the president to the 
benefit of Congress by preventing the president from interpreting and 
shaping the agency’s statutory mandate.110 One version of this theory 
suggests that independent agencies actually aggrandize Congress and 
its committees, thus undermining the unitary executive. In his opinion 
in FCC v. Fox,111 for example, Justice Scalia emphasizes that 
“independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the 
President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from 
presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by 
increased subservience to congressional direction,”112 citing 
considerable scholarly commentary to this effect.113 In addition, 
interest groups are also capable of exerting pressure over 
independent agencies in a way that undermines the claims that the 
 
 109. See, e.g., Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent 
Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 499–504 (1994) (summarizing seven powers the 
executive exercises to varying degrees over independent agencies, including clearance of 
legislative recommendations, controls over personnel and facilities, the power of appointment, 
litigation and representation in court, and powers related to the budgetary process). 
 110. Since 2000, for example, five independent agencies have sent their legislative proposals 
directly to Congress, rather than to the Office of Management and Budget in the White House, 
as required by executive order, to assert their independence. See Breger & Edles, supra note 
103, at 1152 (noting also that though the executive can exert control over independent agencies, 
those agencies can turn to Congress as a means of fighting executive control). 
 111. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 112. Id. at 1815 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id. (citing, inter alia, Steven Calabresi & Sai Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541, 583 (1994); Frank Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of 
the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341 (1994); Kagan, supra note 
22, at 2271 n.93). 
RODRIGUEZ IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:19:14 AM 
2010] CONSTRAINT THROUGH DELEGATION 1825 
agencies’ decisions are expertise-based. This dynamic thus introduces 
the possibility that an independent agency will be subject to political 
influences, but not to direct mechanisms of accountability, such as 
presidential removal.114 And thus, one might characterize the choice 
of independent agency versus executive agency as a choice between 
indirect congressional control and direct presidential control, rather 
than one about relative insulation from politics.115 
If independent agencies are subject to significant external 
control, then insulation may be an insufficient justification for 
creating such an agency. In other words, if insulation is truly difficult 
to achieve, the loss of greater accountability that comes from direct 
and transparent control by a political actor—an accountability that 
arguably characterizes executive agencies—may be too significant a 
tradeoff. In some contexts, the value of insulation may be ephemeral 
in any case because of the nature of the domain being regulated. 
Professor Rachel Barkow has made this point in the sentencing 
context, noting that “political pressures in criminal justice are strong 
enough to overcome any institutional design of insulation, thus 
making criminal justice a unique subject of agency regulation.”116 The 
same may be true for immigration. The political economies of 
immigration law and criminal law resemble one another a great deal. 
Professor Cox and I have explored one way in which this is true with 
respect to prosecutorial discretion.117 In addition, the “tough-on-
crime” and “no-more-immigrants” lines of argument mirror one 
another as zero-tolerance policies, abetted in large part by the fact 
that neither criminal defendants nor noncitizens have much political 
clout—the former because they are an unsympathetic and 
unorganized constituency and the latter because, by definition, they 
lack the right to vote (as is true for some criminal defendants, as 
well). 
 
 114. Cf. Stephenson, supra note 24, at 61 (noting that some presidentialists acknowledge the 
value of entities other than the president playing a role, including interest groups and 
congressional committees, but not for majoritarian reasons). 
 115. Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of 
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 896 (2008) (demonstrating empirically that 
agencies are responsive to political transitions in Congress, not just to presidential transitions, 
and that “[l]egal scholars likely have focused too heavily on the President in examining the 
operation and legitimacy of the administrative state”). 
 116. See Barkow, supra note 75, at 798. 
 117. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 513–16. 
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If insulation is truly unachievable, then perhaps policymakers 
should create an executive agency, making the political controls 
exercised more transparent and therefore subject to more effective 
critique and greater accountability. That said, the critiques outlined 
above arguably cancel each other out, suggesting that neither the 
president nor Congress has complete control over independent 
agencies,118 which means the branches can play off of each other to 
some extent. In other words, though complete insulation from 
political control may be unattainable (and probably also undesirable 
because it would eliminate accountability), the structure of an 
independent agency at least enables tensions between political actors 
to keep politically motivated decisionmaking at bay. In addition, 
scholars have emphasized that, for cultural and political reasons, the 
president shows greater caution when attempting to control an 
independent agency’s agenda than an executive agency’s.119 And, as a 
matter of practice, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) in the White House has subjected independent agencies to 
less centralized review.120 At the same time, the extent of an 
independent agency’s insulation from politics also will depend on the 
internal culture and operations of the agency121 and the president’s 
particular orientation toward the agency, which in turn depends on 
the agency’s substantive mandate and the quality of staffing and 
prestige of the agency. 
The hope of independence, ultimately, need not be abandoned, 
particularly because the objectives outlined in Part I—broad 
responsiveness to popular will but insulation from incremental 
 
 118. Cf. Breger & Edles, supra note 103, at 1234 (“The administrative state is too protean 
for the executive to always desire, or indeed always to be able, to patrol all its far reaches. And, 
Congress is too balkanized to effectively control at all times through oversight and legislation.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard C. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1308 (2006) (describing how most executive orders regulating 
modes of policy analysis do not extend to independent agencies); Breger & Edles, supra note 
103, at 1200 (noting that much of agencies’ independence is determined by culture and a belief 
that the president is not supposed to reach out to independent agencies); Kagan, supra note 22, 
at 2376–77 (noting that removal power does not precisely track the strength of a president’s 
policy influence and emphasizing lesser sanctions, institutional incentives, personal ties, as well 
as long-standing and “psychological” norms of independence). 
 120. Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 135 (2003) (discussing the limited requirements OIRA executive orders 
place on independent agencies). 
 121. See Breger & Edles, supra note 103, at 1234 (noting that administrative process owed 
more to experience than doctrine, which is especially true for the internal operations of 
agencies). 
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populist shocks, as well as responsiveness to changing 
circumstances—still militate in favor of independence. Because the 
cultural norms of independence take shape over time, for a new 
immigration commission, it will be important for Congress to create 
structures that encourage norms of independence to emerge. 
Independence and insulation from politics are ultimately matters of 
degree,122 and Congress can design an agency or commission to sit at 
various points on an independence-to-accountability spectrum by 
varying the indicia of independence built into the agency’s 
framework. 
The institutional features of a new immigration commission 
should include a multimember, bipartisan decisionmaking structure 
located outside existing agencies, both to avoid direct presidential 
control123 and to circumvent the inertia of the existing immigration 
bureaucracy. Above all, securing insulation may be less about 
eliminating political controls than about opening up space for 
apolitical, data-based regulatory analysis to play a significant role in 
the policy process. As the discussion of the relative 
nonresponsiveness of the bureaucracy in Part I suggests, even if 
politics cannot be removed from regulation altogether, drawing 
agents with nonpolitical incentives into a central position in the 
decisionmaking structure can heighten attention to technocratic 
concerns. Even under this framework, the president’s concerns, 
particularly with respect to foreign policy, could play a role in policy 
formation by using his power of appointment to require the agency to 
consult with the Departments of Labor, Homeland Security, State, 
and others. 
2. Congressional Monitoring of Executive Policymaking.  
Whether the agency takes the form of an independent commission, or 
an agency directly controlled by the president, policymakers should 
give additional thought to the shape congressional oversight might 
take. Two possibilities for this oversight include the introduction of 
reporting requirements similar to those established in the Refugee 
Act and formal report-and-wait requirements. Such oversight will 
 
 122. Cf. Kagan, supra note 22, at 2376–77 (noting that when insulation from removal is 
combined with a multimember, bipartisan commission structure, and long-standing norms of 
independence held widely within the bureaucracy and Congress, “the gap between the agency 
and the President almost inexorably widens”). 
 123. See Gersen, supra note 73, at 28 (noting that the location of new agencies outside 
existing bureaucratic structures can heighten insulation). 
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help to promote legitimacy, particularly given that the creation of an 
agency to make core immigration policy would represent a significant 
reallocation of power. And, particularly in the creation of an 
independent agency, accountability concerns make congressional 
controls even more important. Even assuming critics are correct that 
congressional committees exert considerable influence over 
independent agencies by definition, Congress can build additional 
and more formalized mechanisms of congressional consultation or 
control into the agency’s decisionmaking processes to ensure 
transparent oversight. Similarly, if Congress chooses to create an 
executive agency and believes either that the president’s position at 
the top of the scheme is not sufficient to ensure accountability to the 
people, or that the president’s influence should be limited in some 
way short of denying him removal power, congressional monitoring 
mechanisms of some kind will be useful.124 
As suggested at the outset of this Part, Congress could add ex 
ante mechanisms into the agency’s framework statute to limit 
executive discretion. Congress could list particular employment 
categories to which the agency must give priority, determine annual 
ceilings, dictate the proportion of visas to be allocated between 
certain industries or between high- and low-skilled workers, or 
declare certain factors, such as the interests of U.S. workers, to be 
more important than other factors, such as economic growth. Most 
constraints of this sort, however, would undermine core purposes of 
creating the commission—flexibility and responsiveness—in favor of 
predictability, stability, and constraint, thus approximating the status 
quo. A new system that substantially maintains the status quo would 
 
 124. Ample literature exists on congressional control. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, 
Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 433–40 (1989) 
(observing that Congress prefers structures and processes that insulate agencies from 
congressional influence, because the enacting coalition wants to “lock in” policy gains by 
making it harder for future Congresses to undo its work); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 
1456–59 (2003) (describing Congress’s use of “ex ante limits on agency decisionmaking and ex 
post oversight by congressional committees” to control its “delegated power[s]”); Macey, supra 
note 107, at 99–101 (discussing how Congress can use the design structure of agencies to 
maximize its control over them); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243–45 
(1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures] (summarizing the ways in 
which Congress can enhance its control through procedural changes); Mathew D. McCubbins & 
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (defining two types of congressional oversight). 
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not justify wholesale institutional reform. As a result, instead of 
imposing ex ante statutory constraints, policymakers should consider 
congressional monitoring mechanisms that take procedural form and 
include formal consultation, report-and-wait requirements, and 
deadlines that require the agency to set annual numbers by a certain 
point in the fiscal year. 
The inclusion of some of the so-called “police patrol”125 measures 
should be a threshold expectation. These measures could include 
regular reporting requirements to congressional committees and 
perhaps also to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which 
could independently assess the agency’s interpretation of and 
response to the data it collects. Formal consultation requirements 
could promote good-faith engagement with congressional committees 
at a relatively low cost.126 Recent refugee consultation hearings reflect 
congressional awareness of and concern for the executive branch’s 
recent failures to reach the ceilings set by the president, as well as 
implementation challenges faced by the executive and caused by 
Congress’s own alterations to the statutory scheme, such as its 
enactment of the bar to refugee status for those who have provided 
“material support” to terrorists. As noted in Part II.B, scholars have 
criticized the congressional oversight process in the refugee system as 
being little more than ceremonial,127 or even as make-work. But even 
if these critiques are accurate, the formal consultation requirement at 
least has the virtue of bringing together multiple actors serving 
different constituencies to assess the executive branch’s 
recommendations. The consultation also creates a public record 
identifying issues of concern and limitations in the workings of the 
bureaucracy.128 
 
 125. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 124, at 166. 
 126. See Anker & Posner, supra note 71, at 49 (noting the concern in the House that formal 
methods of consultation would discourage good-faith efforts to solicit congressional input into 
presidential decisions to raise the numerical limit over fifty thousand, in response to which the 
attorney general defended the consultation process as a “report-and-wait” provision). 
 127. For additional discussion of congressional oversight in the refugee context, see supra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 128. In the wake of INS v. Chadha, Congress continued to enact statutes that required 
specific committee approval for agency action. Despite resistance from presidents regarding the 
constitutionality of these requirements, agencies apparently have tended to respect Congress’s 
wishes, displaying a deference born out of the agencies’ status as repeat players before the 
committees. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 (1993). Though because of Chadha, I would favor report-and-wait 
requirements; Congress could write strong committee oversight into the agency’s statute to 
encourage substantive dialogue with Congress that renders it more of a player than it has 
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So-called report-and-wait requirements similarly could provide 
Congress with a window into and an incentive to evaluate the 
executive’s determinations.129 These statutory provisions would build 
in time between the agency’s articulation of annual limits and their 
taking effect, giving Congress or the relevant committees the 
opportunity to review the standards and to act legislatively if 
objections arise.130 In a sense, such provisions only replicate the 
normal state of affairs, given that Congress always has the power to 
overturn agency action by passing legislation. But a report-and-wait 
provision can at least send a signal that a particular agency action 
deserves attention or scrutiny by expanding the ordinary thirty-day 
period before agency rules go into effect and providing Congress with 
more time to engage in review, before reliance interests set in. 
The Sentencing Commission is set up along such lines. Its rules 
take effect 180 days after their announcement, unless Congress passes 
legislation to stop them.131 Congress most famously exercised this 
power when it blocked the Commission’s proposal to address the 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine—an action 
ultimately supported by the president, who signed the rejection into 
law.132 Because the Commission is a judicial agency, it is quite 
 
become in the refugee selection process. See id. at 288 (discussing how Chadha has driven 
committee vetoes underground, “where they operate on the basis of informal and non-statutory 
understandings”). 
 129. For a discussion of report-and-wait systems, see L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and 
Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 79, 93–94 (1982). 
 130. The Migration Policy Institute proposal follows such an approach. 
The Standing Commission would be required by statute to submit an annual report 
and recommendations simultaneously to the president and Congress. After a 
specified period of congressional consultation, unless Congress acted to maintain 
existing statutory baseline labor market immigration levels, the president would issue 
a formal Determination of New Levels, adjusting employment-based green-card 
quotas and preferences and temporary worker visa limits for the coming fiscal year. 
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 44, at 16. A Brookings Institution-Duke University Policy 
Roundtable has proposed an independent standing commission that would publish reports and 
studies on many aspects of immigration policy and biennially recommend overall visa category 
ceilings for congressional review and action. See Executive Summary, Brookings-Duke 
Immigration Policy Roundtable, Breaking the Immigration Stalemate: From Deep 
Disagreements to Constructive Proposals (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
reports/2009/1006_immigration_roundtable.aspx. 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006) (requiring the Commission to submit guidelines to Congress 
by May 1 of a given year and providing that proposed amendments take effect within 180 days 
of announcement unless Congress passes legislation rejecting the amendments). 
 132. See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1332 n.75 (2005). 
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independent from the president. As a result, the presidential veto 
represents much less of a threat to the congressional control 
mechanism than it does in relation to executive agencies.133 Because 
the president’s views are not necessarily in line with the views of the 
Commission, the report-and-wait provision offers a potentially robust 
tool for Congress in the sentencing context. Indeed, in the case of the 
crack/powder cocaine controversy, the president was susceptible to 
the very same law-and-order political dynamics as Congress and 
therefore had preferences in line with Congress’s.134 However, the 
possibility of a presidential veto in response to congressional efforts 
to overturn agency action suggests that report-and-wait requirements 
have far less utility in the context of an executive agency, because the 
agency’s outputs are more likely to be in line with the president’s 
preferences, and the president will be more likely to back an agency 
up with a veto of congressional rejection of the agency’s rules. 
Despite the theoretical utility of report-and-wait provisions in 
independent settings, however, Congress has rejected Sentencing 
Commission amendments only twice,135 highlighting that the value of 
report-and-wait provisions may come less from their actual use than 
from the incentives their existence gives to agencies to anticipate 
Congress’s concerns.136 As a general matter, report-and-wait 
provisions require significant congressional effort to overturn an 
executive determination, including overcoming a presidential veto, 
and may therefore lead to little more than delay.137 Over time, 
 
 133. If the president controls an agency, the agency’s rules are likely to be in line with the 
president’s preferences, such that even if Congress objects to the agency’s rules and attempts to 
pass legislation overturning them, the chances of a presidential veto are high, unless there is a 
transition in administration. In the context of an independent agency or commission, where the 
president’s views are less likely to be in line with the agency’s views, a congressional move to 
overturn agency regulations is less likely to be met with a presidential veto. 
 134. See Statement on Signing Legislation Rejecting U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Recommendations, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1700 (Oct. 30, 1995). 
 135. See Bowman, supra note 132, at 1341 n.119. 
 136. One potential problem with report-and-wait requirements suggested by the experience 
of the Sentencing Commission is congressional micromanagement—a problem that dovetails 
with the literature discussed in Part II.C.1 concerning congressional control of agencies. Some 
scholars have suggested that federal sentencing reform has led Congress to attempt to influence 
the Commission through statutory directives that the Commission “consider” or adopt a new 
guidelines provision, usually one that involves sentencing enhancements in a manner that 
reflects the political “cause du jour.” See Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of 
Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; or Confessions of Two Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1001, 1123–24 (2001). 
 137. In 1996, Congress passed the Congressional Review Act (CRA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
110 Stat. 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006)), which essentially imposes report-and-wait 
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Congress may simply come to rubber-stamp the agency’s 
determinations through inaction, suggesting that the provisions might 
amplify the costs of rulemaking without providing true accountability 
benefits.138 In addition, a congressional “no” is a blunt instrument and 
provides the agency with little guidance concerning how to 
reformulate its regulatory agenda.139 If, therefore, the goal of 
congressional review is to provide agencies with guidance, report-
and-wait provisions may have limited value. 
 
requirements for a wide swath of executive regulations. The sorts of determinations that the 
agency under consideration would make might qualify as “major rules” under the Congressional 
Review Act, which would mean that the agency would be required to submit a concise general 
statement regarding the new rules to Congress, as well as to provide the GAO with a cost-
benefit analysis of the rules, among other things. A major rule is defined as one that OIRA has 
found has resulted in or is likely to result in a one-hundred-million-dollar effect on the 
economy; a major increase in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on competition, jobs, 
investments, and productivity. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2). Presumably the standards the agency sets 
would be an economic plus and a boost to competition, but particularly with respect to low-
skilled immigration, the costs to U.S. workers in the form of depressed wages could qualify the 
agency’s work for the statute’s requirements. For further discussion on the requirements of the 
CRA, see Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–102 (1997). The use of the CRA has been sporadic, however, suggesting 
either that overcoming a presidential veto can be difficult; that once a problem is delegated to 
an agency, inertia keeps it largely in the control of the executive; or that performing oversight 
functions, although important to committees, may not be of great import to Congress as a 
whole. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF 
AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 
ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30116.pdf 
(summarizing critiques, including that the CRA provides no expedited consideration procedure 
in the House, no screening mechanism to identify rules that may require special congressional 
attention, and the fact that disapproval of a significant or politically sensitive rule is likely to 
need a supermajority to be successful if Congress and the White House are under the control of 
different parties); id. (noting that as of March 31, 2008, GAO had cataloged submissions of over 
47,000 rules, and Congress had introduced only forty-seven joint resolutions of disapproval 
relating to thirty-five rules); id. at 15 (noting that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) ergonomics rules were disapproved in 2001 but that this disapproval 
has been attributed to circumstances of the rules’ passage, including control of both houses of 
Congress and the presidency by the same party, long-standing opposition to the standards, and 
the willingness of the president to undo the contentious rule of the previous administration); id. 
at 44 (“[T]he limited utilization of the formal disapproval process in the ten years since 
enactment has arguably reduced the threat of possible congressional scrutiny and disapproval as 
a factor in agency rule development.”). For an excellent review of the history of the CRA, see 
generally Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162 (2009). 
 138. See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 137, at 104 (discussing the CRA and its failure to 
“secure the enhanced congressional responsibility for the outcomes of rulemaking that seems to 
be among its principal justifications”). 
 139. Id. at 104–05 (“Rather than take political responsibility for defining the agency’s 
authority, Congress leaves to the courts the task of working out the meaning of its Delphic ‘No!’ 
This is an evasion, not an assumption, of political control.”). 
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But report-and-wait provisions at least provide a means of 
promoting transparency, a moderate incentive for the executive to 
consider potential legislative preferences, a prod to future Congresses 
to evaluate the agency’s outputs, and an added veneer of democratic 
legitimacy. The delay of implementation gives powerful opposition 
forces a chance to mobilize to stop rules before they go into effect 
and create reliance interests. The agency, aware of this possibility, 
may be less likely to set limits that will upset Congress or the interest 
groups most affected by its rules. 
Finally, the newly created agency must be required to set visa 
numbers by a certain date each fiscal year to avoid delay and to 
ensure predictability for employers and those who intend to 
immigrate. As a recent empirical study of the use of deadlines in 
administrative law reveals, deadlines provide Congress with an easy 
mechanism to ensure compliance, but deadlines might also result in 
“reductions in quality along the substantive dimension.”140 To be sure, 
the creation of a deadline would reduce the rigor of the consultation 
processes discussed above, but over time the agency and relevant 
committees will become more efficient at the process of review 
(admittedly raising the possibility that it will become pro forma). In 
addition, because visas must issue every year, regardless of which 
branch is responsible for setting the visa numbers, the responsible 
branch must make decisions quickly, which calls for mechanisms that 
minimize delay, and the ongoing nature of the visa-setting process 
provides the agency with opportunity for correction each year if its 
decisionmaking turns out to be faulty. Alternatives include the 
statutory default rules discussed at the outset of this Part, or a default 
rule that the previous year’s numbers set by the agency will control, if 
the agency fails to act by its deadline. But whereas the former 
diminishes the agency’s incentives to act, the latter might serve as a 
useful safeguard to ensure that agency inaction does not bring the 
labor immigration system to a halt. 
 
 140. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 923, 932 (2008) (“It is easier to specify and monitor compliance for the temporal 
preference (say with a quick deadline), but doing so may produce shirking or reductions in 
quality along the substantive dimension. Congressional choice about whether to regulate 
substance, timing, or procedure depends in part on the costs of specifying the rule ex ante and 
monitoring agency compliance along each dimension ex post.”); id. at 952 (“Deadlines stand out 
as one of few areas where courts will compel agencies to act despite multiple demands on their 
resources.”). 
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3. Public Participation, Judicial Review, and Other Controls.  
Other process and structure tools exist to constrain agency 
decisionmaking, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
should apply to the new agency. Most importantly, the tools that 
promote public participation, such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, can ensure that the views of the multiple interest groups 
affected by the formation of labor policy inform the agency’s actions, 
and these groups, through their participation, can serve to monitor 
the agency’s activity.141 The interest groups in this context are 
relatively well developed and organized, in the form of lobbies 
representing business, labor, and immigrants’ rights, though they by 
no means have equal money and influence at their disposal, with the 
latter likely at a relative disadvantage. 
The possibility of interest group participation inevitably raises 
the familiar problem of capture.142 Interests such as labor unions may 
 
 141. For a discussion of this sort of monitoring, see McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 124, 
at 166. For a discussion that distinguishes between ex ante and ex post mechanisms of 
monitoring, when the latter involve congressional oversight to ensure agency compliance with 
legislative goals, and the former refer to the terms of the statute that limit agency authority, see 
Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 105–09, 119–20 (1997). 
Commentators have discussed the ways in which the APA operates as a mechanism through 
which Congress controls administrative agencies. See McCubbins et al., Administrative 
Procedures, supra note 124, at 244 (“By controlling processes, political leaders assign relative 
degrees of importance to the constituents whose interests are at stake in an administrative 
proceeding and thereby channel an agency’s decisions toward the substantive outcomes that are 
most favored by those who are intended to be benefited by the policy.”). For an excellent 
review of the positive political theory literature on administrative design, see Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1767–76 
(2007). To be sure, it may be more difficult than in the average regulatory case to determine 
who is supposed to benefit from the agency’s policies in this instance. The “American economy” 
is not exactly an interest, and the interests of employers, U.S. workers, the consuming public, 
and the potential immigrant do not necessarily align. In addition, among the objectives this idea 
of delegation ought to serve are the general values of democracy and transparency, which high 
levels of prosecutorial discretion undermine in the immigration enforcement context. It is not 
clear how administrative procedures would channel interest-group pressures to advance these 
objectives, though the notice-and-comment procedure itself would render executive 
decisionmaking more transparent and susceptible to public influence than the status quo. This 
exposure, in turn, could simply replicate the status quo if transparency and participation result 
in pressure to keep the number of immigrants admitted formally and legally low. 
 142. For a discussion of theories of agency capture and the difficulties of organizing groups 
to promote the public good for a large and diffuse group of people, and the overwhelming 
influence of industry in the rulemaking process in the environmental context, see Bagley & 
Revesz, supra note 119, at 1284–90. Opponents of delegation in the immigration context have 
emphasized that government commissions are almost never immune from politicization and 
have raised the specter of capture as a reason to maintain the status quo. Press Release, Am. 
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, AILA Position Statement on Business Immigration Reform 
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wind up exerting considerable influence over the selection process, 
resulting in visa allocations that prioritize U.S. worker interests at the 
expense of economic growth, the reduction of illegality,143 or the very 
flexibility that should be the hallmark of the new regime. The same 
could hold true for employers, whose influence could result in an 
underprioritization of the interests of U.S. workers or the reduction 
of incentives to build up domestic capacity to address the needs of 
particular industries. The interests of future or potential migrants (as 
opposed to immigrants already present) and the general public’s 
interests are also easily obscured. Future migrants are neither 
territorially present nor sociologically part of the polity, and the 
general public is an incredibly diffuse entity, making it difficult for 
either interest to make an impact on the policymaking process. 
The need to take into account these interests, particularly the 
broader public interest, and to avoid interest group dominance of the 
agency make some direct reporting to Congress important, though 
such reporting admittedly may not promise much, given that 
Congress and congressional committees will be influenced by interest 
groups as well. It is not obvious that the intrusion of politics and 
interest groups is wholly undesirable, however. In reformulating the 
existing allocation of power toward the executive and thus toward 
insulation, legitimacy concerns ultimately demand some connection 
to public and political interests. Whether delegation functions as a 
constraint on the executive’s discretion and as a means of promoting 
greater dynamism in the immigration-selection system will depend on 
the ability of interested parties to hold the executive to account for its 
failure to act, and so imperfect public participation is preferable to a 
regime hidden from view. 
The procedural requirements of the APA can also help ensure 
reasoned decisionmaking, and judicial doctrines designed to ensure 
that agencies take account of the evidence before them and provide 
reasons for their actions have a role to play in this context. 
Importantly, however, the role of the judiciary should be limited to 
ensuring that the agency addresses public comments and follows 
APA procedures. Courts should avoid hard look review of the 
 
Principles 2 (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.immigrationworksusa.org/uploaded/file/ 
AILA%20Position%20Statement%20on%20Business%20Immigration%20Reform%20Princip
les.pdf. 
 143. This trade-off would be self-defeating for labor interests, because unauthorized 
workers present more of a threat to wages and working conditions than legal workers who have 
bargaining power. 
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agency’s processes, and Congress should preclude review of the 
substantive limits the agency sets, because such review would give rise 
to unnecessary and inappropriate complications.144 In addition, piling 
notice-and-comment rulemaking on top of report-and-wait provisions 
may make it difficult for the agency to complete its business each 
year. Ultimately, the value of each set of requirements provides 
further justification for creating a new agency, rather than relying on 
existing agencies, to balance speed with the need for oversight. 
Finally, the agency’s regime should include two other control 
mechanisms developed in the last few decades. First, and more 
importantly, Congress should require a cost-benefit analysis,145 as well 
as a distributional analysis,146 of visa levels, with the relevant factors to 
be considered to include impacts on the wages of U.S. workers, 
measures of growth and job creation (or loss), and the enforcement 
costs incurred to prevent circumvention of the regime. Requiring this 
analysis on a biennial basis only could reduce the agency’s workload, 
if workload develops as a concern. Though the outcomes of the cost-
benefit analysis need not, and probably should not, be explicitly 
 
 144. For a recent discussion of the need for a “new metaphor” to describe judicial review of 
agency action, and a proposed amendment to the APA that would require courts to be 
deferential to agencies’ analytical methodologies and choice of inferences, relaxing the need for 
factual support in areas of scientific uncertainty, see McGarity, supra note 67, at 557–58. For a 
discussion of the debate over whether strong judicial review and procedural requirements give 
rise to ossification, see supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. It is also possible that courts 
would decline to engage in hard look review of immigration-related decisions because of 
traditional notions of deference to the political branches in these matters. See Cox & Rodríguez, 
supra note 1, at 465–82 (discussing the complex history of judicial deference to the immigration 
policies of the political branches); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1149 (2009) (arguing that in certain areas courts have not taken the hard 
look approach because of political constraints or because rules emerge during times of 
emergency). 
 145. For a recent and robust defense of cost-benefit analysis as “inevitable” as well as 
desirable as a “requirement of basic rationality” that “makes decisionmakers more accountable 
by making their decisions more transparent” and “imposes structure” on the vast discretion of 
agencies, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR 
HEALTH 12 (2008); see also id. at 13–16 (addressing critiques of cost-benefit analysis, including 
that it leads to commodification, unfairly distributes regulatory benefits, and delivers the 
impression but not the reality of scientific certainty). 
 146. See id. at 180–83 (discussing the use of cost-benefit analysis to serve progressive ends); 
see also RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 
N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, FIXING REGULATORY REVIEW: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT 
ADMINISTRATION 14–15 (2008), available at http://www.policyintegrity.org/publications/ 
documents/FixingRegulatoryReview.pdf (“Cost-benefit analysis should be augmented with 
distributional analysis, conducted on a central and holistic level, to account for disadvantaged 
groups, including those that face disproportional environmental, health, and safety risks.”). 
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binding on the agency147 because of the fundamental distributional 
concerns implicated by labor migration, the process of conducting the 
analysis will help ensure informed congressional oversight, good-faith 
agency efforts to compile the appropriate data,148 and transparent 
agency decisionmaking. 
Second, policymakers—both in Congress and the White House—
should consider whether OIRA should review the agency’s visa limits. 
If the agency is established as independent, requiring such review 
would undermine the virtues of independence and add unnecessary 
delay, creating tension with the deadline requirement articulated 
above.149 In addition, if Congress requires consultation with the 
Departments of State, Labor, and Homeland Security, then OIRA 
review may be superfluous. But even given these two conditions, 
some White House scrutiny and coordination may well be warranted, 
given both the political nature of the agency’s mandate and the 
sprawl of the immigration bureaucracy across the executive branch. 
III.  FEASIBILITY 
Whether the creation of an agency or commission amounts to a 
good idea depends in part on its feasibility, in two senses. First, is it 
realistic to think that Congress will delegate to the president authority 
that has become, over time, the province of Congress? As noted at 
the outset of this Article, the Supreme Court has repeated on 
numerous occasions that “the [notion that the] formulation of 
[immigration] policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has 
become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial 
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”150 Given 
that this concept of congressional primacy over core immigration 
decisions has evolved principally through interaction between the 
 
 147. The agency’s framework statute can specify that cost-benefit analysis must be 
conducted, but that it need not be binding on the agency. It may be that the requirement of 
analysis will lead the agency to rely on it more often than not, but at least this structure would 
give the agency room to exercise its discretion. 
 148. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 146, at 21 (emphasizing that OIRA should 
make sure that agencies gather necessary background data and build an adequate knowledge 
base to regulate). 
 149. For a discussion of the OIRA process and its limitations, including that there is little 
reason to think that agency capture cannot happen to OIRA or the president, see Bagley & 
Revesz, supra note 119, at 1304–12, and see also Rubin, supra note 120, at 135–37. 
 150. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766–67 
(1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
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political branches themselves and not through judicial imposition (the 
oft-repeated quotation above represents a bit of observational dicta), 
Congress may well regard the delegation of core immigration power 
as anathema, or as a threat to the powers it has claimed over time, as 
immigrant admissions has evolved from a treaty-based endeavor to a 
legislative one.151 
Second and more important is the question of whether an agency 
will be able to meet the objectives Congress sets for it. This 
evaluation will be predictive in nature, and given how poorly the 
current system channels labor migration, taking a structural redesign 
approach that differs radically from the status quo has its virtues as an 
experiment. But it nonetheless remains important to confront the 
possibility that the executive will not exercise the power delegated to 
it in a way that addresses the rule-of-law or stasis problems that 
present the primary motivations for institutional redesign, or that the 
same factors that constrain Congress from acting will not also distort 
the executive’s decisionmaking. 
On the first question of political feasibility, I leave aside whether 
the current mix of Democrats and Republicans in Congress, the 
legislative priorities of the current president, and the legislative 
agenda as it is now unfolding would be conducive to the creation of 
an agency, largely because such details are ephemeral. Instead, the 
important question is whether Congress, as a general structural 
matter, will be willing to delegate its power. Historically, Congress 
has been resistant to executive meddling in the allocation of visas. 
During the 1965 immigration reforms, for example, a proposal to 
create a commission charged with allocating visas proved to be a 
sticking point. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act152 eliminated the national-
origins quotas but phased in the new regime over a period of years. 
Members of the Johnson State Department were nonetheless 
concerned about the foreign policy implications of reducing the 
number of visas available to Northern European immigrants, even 
though the visas were underutilized.153 The bill would have put into 
place a procedure for executive reallocation of visas to provide “the 
flexibility needed to deal with unforeseeable problems of fairness and 
 
 151. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 483. 
 152. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 153. Edward M. Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 137, 145–46 (1966). 
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foreign policy.”154 It would have required the president to consult with 
a new Immigration Board, whose task would have been conducting 
continuous study of migration conditions and advising the president 
on criteria for admission.155 
Key players in the House—primarily Representative Michael 
Feighan, Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary—resisted.156 Feighan argued that the 
Board would “usurp [Congress’s] statutory duty and functions” of 
regulating immigration,157 transforming the president’s limited power 
to keep immigrants out in emergencies into a power to let them in.158 
The administration ultimately bowed to the pressure engendered by 
the specter of executive micromanagement and dropped the 
Commission from the bill.159 
 
 154. See Immigration, supra note 4, at 414 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of 
the United States). 
 155. Id. at 392 (statement of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States) (suggesting 
in writing that “it would be orderly for the executive branch to have the benefit of the study, 
advice, and guidance of a board”). 
 156. Chairman Feighan questioned Secretary Rusk: “[D]oes your proposal suggest that 
Congress is inadequate for the task of establishing a clear and all-inclusive immigration policy?” 
Id. (statement of Rep. Feighan, Chairman, Subcomm. No. 1, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
Secretary Rusk responded: “No, Mr. Chairman. Both under the Constitution and under the 
practices of our system of government, it is for the Congress to establish the basic policy and the 
basic legislation.” Id. (testimony of Dean Rusk). 
  Chairman Feighan also questioned Attorney General Kennedy: “[T]o what extent does 
the administration proposal call upon Congress to divest itself of its traditional authority under 
decisions of the Supreme Court for regulating immigration in the United States?” Id. (statement 
of Rep. Feighan). Attorney General Kennedy dismissed the chairman’s concerns, stating, 
I do not think it really does[,] . . . . no. I think it sets up certain standards which must 
be followed by the executive branch of the Government, by the President of the 
United States . . . . I think that this is one tight control over the situation by the 
legislative branch of Government. The authority that the President has is only to 
soften somewhat the impact of a change from one system to another. But the 
President, Mr. Chairman, does not have the authority under this legislation to permit 
a greater number of immigrants to come into the United States from any country than 
are permitted to come under the present system. 
Id. at 423–24 (testimony of Robert F. Kennedy). 
  Members of the administration sought to reassure Congress that the Board would not 
be overly responsive to political pressure. See id. at 474 (testimony of Norbert A. Schlei, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“The Immigration Board would be a very high-level 
policy board that would not be getting any supervision at all from the executive branch. It would 
be the highest policy source in the Government, and would give advice to the President, to the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of State, the people who are 
involved in the various aspects of immigration policy.”). 
 157. Id. at 393, 423 (statement of Rep. Feighan). 
 158. Id. at 424. 
 159. For a discussion of the debate over the Commission, see Kennedy, supra note 153, at 
140, and see also Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 541 n.266. 
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The Hart-Celler experience raises the classic administrative law 
question of why Congress does or does not delegate.160 As noted 
above, in the case of immigration, Congress may be reluctant to 
delegate because of a general desire to protect its territory, as core 
immigration policy over time has become entrenched in Congress’s 
bailiwick. Perhaps Congress regards immigrant admissions decisions 
as value judgments that do not require the expertise of agencies or 
bureaucrats—a key factor in the decision to delegate. To put the 
proposition in lofty terms, immigrant admissions constitute 
membership decisions, which belong to the legislative body standing 
in for the people. 
But the notion that setting immigration levels is different in kind 
from other policy decisions made by administrative agencies seems 
grandiose and blinkered. Other regulatory matters handled by 
agencies, such as the setting of environmental or occupational health 
and safety standards, have serious economic and distributional 
implications and involve moral and policy judgments concerning the 
value of human life, both present and future, and the need to protect 
industry and promote innovation. And as with other regulatory 
matters, the tradeoffs made in the immigration context are influenced 
by typical political and interest group pressures from unions, ethnic 
lobbies, business groups, and the foreign policy establishment, among 
others. More to the point, the central conclusion drawn in The 
President and Immigration Law is that the executive does make 
“membership” decisions as a de facto matter, though in a fashion that 
is generally nontransparent and parasitic on the existence of high 
levels of socially dysfunctional illegal immigration.161 
Of course, the fact that the claim of congressional monopoly over 
membership decisions does not ring true does not make it any less a 
part of Congress’s self-conception, so the claim remains a potential 
obstacle to delegation. What is more, Congress and the executive 
have not historically shared preferences concerning how many 
 
 160. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATED POWERS 
29–35, 151–54, 196–231 (1999) (observing that delegation tends to occur when there is unified 
government or with respect to matters involving technical expertise or detail). 
 161. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 510–19 (describing how “the modern structure 
of immigration law that gives the President little standard-setting authority as a formal matter 
actually has given rise to a system of de facto delegation of power that serves as the functional 
equivalent to standard-setting authority,” in light of the executive’s power to enforce legal rules 
that make significant populations of immigrants removable). 
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immigrants to admit, irrespective of the parties in power, thus making 
Congress more reluctant to delegate. Presidents have tended to be 
more expansionist than Congress. Multiple presidents vetoed the 
literacy-test requirement that Congress sought to impose in the early 
twentieth century;162 four presidents, beginning with Roosevelt and 
including Eisenhower, sought to remove the national-origins quotas 
from the law before President Johnson finally signed the legislation 
that did so in 1965;163 and Roosevelt, Truman, and George W. Bush all 
advocated temporary worker programs in the face of strong 
resistance by Congress.164 
Finally, Congress may desire to maintain low limits or consistent 
ceilings on immigration—even as it reshuffles priorities within the 
system—to be seen as responsive to public preferences. Even if low 
limits result in the production of illegal immigration (or pressure from 
certain high-tech industries to admit more high-skilled immigrants), 
these costs are likely limited ones worth bearing, because Congress 
never faces direct or exclusive blame for the rise of illegal 
immigration. Instead, it can easily deflect that blame to the president 
and the failure of his dysfunctional agencies to enforce the law,165 or to 
the illegal immigrant lawbreaker himself.166 Congress can 
 
 162. Id. at 483 n.83. 
 163. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 164. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 482 n.78, 535. 
 165. Other scholars have offered a different perspective on blame avoidance. See Jide O. 
Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational 
Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 625, 640 (2010) (arguing that blame 
avoidance represents a rational response to voter preferences that the president share power or 
seek assent from other agents before engaging in policymaking). 
 166. Some scholars of delegation emphasize that Congress delegates as a means of shifting 
blame and political costs to agencies and that Congress has the capacity to produce detailed, 
complex legislation through time-consuming processes when it will benefit from doing so. See 
MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 48–49 (2d 
ed. 1989); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES 
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 10, 55 (1993) (underscoring Congress’s capacity to 
legislate on complex matters and arguing that Congress shirks its duties in unconstitutional ways 
when it delegates to unelected bureaucrats, noting that “broad delegation helps to insulate 
Congress and the White House from political accountability for supporting laws that are 
harmful to the broad public interest”); see also Aranson et al., supra note 50, at 33 (“The 
delegate with broad discretion offers the legislator a substitute for taking direct action that 
different constituents might find objectionable.”). This dynamic suggests that a major incentive 
for delegation may not exist in the immigration context, because the political costs already have 
been diffused. Others have been critical of the blame shifting literature. See HORN, supra note 
51, at 44–46 (expressing skepticism that legislators can shift blame to agencies, as this move 
would require apathetic, uninformed voters, and noting that delegations still occur in 
parliamentary systems, in which “responsibility is perfectly clear,” because it belongs to the 
RODRIGUEZ IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:19:14 AM 
1842 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1787 
simultaneously garner ever-greater public support for its policies of 
shoveling more money into new enforcement initiatives such as the 
border fence—a crowd-pleasing way of addressing the pressures of 
economic migration—and then blame the executive for failing to 
spend that money effectively.167 
These obstacles to delegation loom large, but whether Congress 
could be persuaded to delegate ultimately depends on what, exactly, 
Congress would be delegating. Substantively, Congress might be 
more willing to draft a statute that sets visa ceilings but permits the 
agency to allocate visas among types of labor migrants according to 
its data-based judgments than to give an agency complete power over 
the process. But, as emphasized throughout this Article, such an 
agency would be of limited benefit and probably not worth the time 
and resources that would be allocated to its creation and 
maintenance.  
Structurally, the creation of an independent agency that limits 
the president’s powers may be more appealing to Congress than an 
agency that gives the president new powers, especially if Justice 
Scalia’s claim in FCC v. Fox that congressional committees exert 
tremendous control over independent agencies turns out to be true,168 
or if Congress is uncertain about the trajectory of political 
preferences.169 That said, the creation of an independent agency raises 
the accountability flag, and in some regulatory arenas, including 
immigration, members of Congress might desire broad political 
control by the political branches, particularly in a moment of unified 
government, but also if Congress can carve out a role for itself to 
monitor, through oversight mechanisms, a presidentially controlled 
agency. In the end, given that lawmakers often delegate to reduce 
 
governing party responsible for all measures “taken or not taken”); Mashaw, supra note 51, at 
86 (noting that none of these theories are supported by more than anecdotal evidence). 
 167. Professor Cox and I make a similar point in The President and Immigration Law, 
emphasizing that Congress derives political benefits of the law-and-order variety from making 
the immigration laws ever harsher by expanding the grounds for removal, while relying on the 
executive to ameliorate the harsh consequences of such laws through prosecutorial discretion 
and other means. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 529. 
 168. For further discussion on congressional control over independent agencies, see supra 
notes 108–20 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Gersen, supra note 73, at 12 (citing literature suggesting that legislators are more 
likely to turn to insulated boards as design tools when uncertainty increases, which suggests that 
Congress will be more likely to create an independent agency when it is uncertain about the 
future political preferences of Congress or the executive). 
RODRIGUEZ IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:19:14 AM 
2010] CONSTRAINT THROUGH DELEGATION 1843 
decisionmaking costs in complex regulatory arenas,170 a key factor in 
securing delegation will be persuading lawmakers that immigration is 
an issue that demands expertise and data-driven (not just value-
driven) judgments, and that better policy would result from 
incorporating the value added by the bureaucracy into the 
decisionmaking process. 
The second feasibility question requires determining whether it 
would be worth conducting the delegation experiment in the first 
place—to determine if the executive is likely to use its new powers in 
a manner that addresses the pathologies of the status quo. The risk of 
agency inaction or underregulation in this context might be high. 
First, the president might actually prefer an illegal immigration 
system over one in which the executive admits greater numbers of 
workers ex ante. Unauthorized workers are easier to remove than 
their authorized counterparts—fewer due process constraints limit 
the executive’s ability to remove—and their wages are necessarily 
lower, making them a better option for employers looking for low-
cost labor. As with Congress, this scenario allows the president to 
diffuse the blame for illegal immigration. Though the executive can 
be criticized for failing to enforce Congress’s laws, easy scapegoats for 
executive fecklessness exist in the lawbreaker himself and the 
unscrupulous employer who attracted him to the United States in the 
first place. But if a president were to expand the numbers of visible, 
legal immigrants, the public could hold him more directly accountable 
for circumventing the public preference for lower immigration levels 
and blame him for deliberately (rather than haplessly) taking jobs 
from Americans. 
In the context of the refugee-selection system, the numbers of 
refugees the president has authorized for admission have remained 
relatively constant over the last decade, fluctuating between 70,000 
and 90,000—though, if the sample is expanded to include the years 
since 1980, the number has gone as high as 231,700 and as low as 
67,000.171 Perhaps it turns out that the average number of refugees in 
 
 170. For additional discussion of this dynamic, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 171. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 30, at 885 (compiling statistics from Yearbooks 
of Immigration Statistics); see also KELLY J. JEFFERYS & DANIEL C. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2007, at 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2007.pdf (noting 
that the number of refugees admitted declined from approximately one hundred thousand 
during the 1990s to fifty thousand in the period from 2000 to 2007 and that “decline is partly due 
to changes in security procedures after 9/11 and admission requirements resulting from the USA 
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the world remains relatively constant and their origins simply shift 
around the globe. More likely, presidents may have hit upon a 
number that has not met with resistance but is sufficient to make the 
foreign policy gains and accrue the international humanitarian 
credibility they desire from refugee admissions. 
If the goal of delegation is to ensure responsiveness to changed 
conditions, and the result is a stable equilibrium, then the primary 
benefit of delegation might be nothing more than the possibility of 
adjustment without protracted legislative debate. The difficulties of 
dealing with agency inaction and inertia have been the subject of 
inconclusive consternation among scholars.172 The concern in the 
immigration context is less that the president will not regulate at all—
by statute he would be required to set visa numbers annually—and 
more that he will not use the power in a way that offsets the extent of 
back-end screening that occurs, or that accounts in a meaningful way 
for what the collected data suggest is needed in a particular sector of 
the economy. This issue arises primarily because the same political 
pressures that operate on Congress to keep immigration low will 
operate on a politically accountable president (in part through 
Congress and its appropriations decisions and committee oversight).173  
 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005”); MARTIN, supra note 95, at vii (noting 
that officials historically have treated the president’s number as a ceiling, not a target, and 
advocating the treatment of numbers as targets to better ensure admissions and “provide a 
benchmark for accountability of the various actors in the system”). During a congressional 
consultation in 2006, Senator Edward Kennedy highlighted a structural problem that has 
contributed to the failure to reach the ceilings set by the president. See Oversight Hearing: U.S. 
Refugee Admissions and Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security 
and Citizenship, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 29 (2006) (testimony of Father 
Kenneth Gavin, S.J., National Director, Jesuit Refugee Service/USA) (responding to the 
questions of Sen. Kennedy, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
that “doubling of the unallocated reserve represents a serious problem in that it indicates a lack 
of sufficient commitment, planning and resource allocation by the Department of State to reach 
the full authorized admissions figure”); see also id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Cornyn, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Immigration, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that “while refugee ceiling 
remains at 70,000, the Government has not consistently been able to meet this threshold” 
because “legitimate refugees are barred because the definition of ‘terrorist activity’ is too 
broad”). 
 172. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 119, at 1277–80. 
 173. Standard administrative law doctrines would require that the agency take into account 
all of the relevant data presented to it, but this requirement imposes only a reasonable 
explanation expectation and would not speak to the way the agency uses the data it has 
assembled itself. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
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But even if the potential for adjustment represents the best 
possible outcome of delegation, the creation of a new decisionmaking 
structure could still have benefits by making more regular adjustment 
institutionally possible should political dynamics allow it, as well as by 
heightening the executive’s accountability for core policymaking. In 
addition, reasons enough exist to believe that the executive will 
exercise the authority Congress delegates to it and will be at least 
somewhat responsive to changing conditions. As noted above, 
presidents historically have been more willing to admit immigrants 
than Congress.174 A culture of professionalism may motivate 
commissioners and bureaucrats within an agency to fulfill its statutory 
mandate, particularly if the agency is set up as independent.175 It also 
seems quite possible that the executive would prefer to shift its law 
enforcement resources away from apprehending immigration-status 
violators and toward larger public-order problems, such as drug 
trafficking and its associated violence, and human smuggling. This 
desire for resource allocation represents an incentive for the 
executive to channel more labor migration through ex ante legal 
channels rather than to rely on ex post prosecutorial discretion and 
enforcement.176 
CONCLUSION 
Through dynamic interaction, the political branches have settled 
on a scheme of separated powers in the immigration context that 
leaves the formal authority to make core immigration policy decisions 
in the hands of Congress. As a practical matter, however, the 
executive exercises considerable authority of the same kind, but 
largely through nontransparent discretionary acts. In addition, the 
congressional monopoly on formal admissions decisions has produced 
an immigration regime slow to respond to changes in demography, 
economy, and social structure, particularly across borders, in large 
part because of the difficulty of achieving legislative consensus in this 
 
 174. See supra notes 92–93, 161–64 and accompanying text. 
 175. For a discussion of the insulation and technocratic nature of the executive, see supra 
Part II.C.1. 
 176. Presumably, the executive could curtail its enforcement actions against unauthorized 
immigrants, thus retaining the power to shift enforcement resources regardless of whether 
Congress delegates the sort of power I envision in this Article. But the political costs of failure 
to enforce remain significant enough for the president that it seems reasonable to assume that 
the executive would use its ex ante authority to diminish the political need to use enforcement 
authority against status violators. 
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arena. It is therefore time to rethink the allocation of power and to 
follow the lead of the Refugee Act of 1980 in delegating standard-
setting power to the executive.  
Delegating power to the executive to manage the situation at 
hand through ex ante rule-like procedures would bring the lines of 
accountability into better view, regardless of the exact contours of 
that delegation. Delegation would thus help ensure that the exertion 
of executive power in the immigration arena serves defined purposes 
through transparent policymaking processes that produce measurable 
outcomes. In addition, delegation could well make the admissions 
process more responsive to regulatory reality. Determining how to 
balance insulation of admissions decisions from the costs of the 
legislative process to promote data-based decisionmaking, with 
promotion of accountability on the subject of whom to admit to the 
United States, will be a challenge. But the need for an institutional 
solution to the limitations of the current regime is clear, and scholars 
and lawmakers should take up the challenge of reimagining the 
allocation of decisionmaking authority to produce a more effective 
and transparent immigration policy. 
